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11 Antitrust law in global markets
Anu Bradford*
INTRODUCTION
Multilateral corporations’ activities span across global markets. Yet antitrust laws regu-
lating those activities remain national. Europeans can ban American companies from 
merging,1 tell American companies how to design their products,2 or determine what 
kind of discounts American companies are permitted to off er to their customers.3 Chinese 
can impose conditions on off - shore mergers.4 And Brazilians can insist on reviewing a 
transaction with minimal connections to the Brazilian market.5
As the global web of antitrust laws thickens, companies are forced to navigate 
an increasingly complex regulatory environment. The need to comply with mul-
tiple  diff erent domestic antitrust regimes exposes multinational corporations to 
additional transaction costs, delays, and uncertainty. Simultaneous application of 
many antitrust laws carries the risk of enforcement confl icts and is likely to lead to 
global  overenforcement of antitrust laws. A lack of international antitrust regulation 
may also lead to antitrust protectionism if states underenforce their antitrust laws 
towards domestic corporations, while overenforcing those same laws towards foreign 
corporations.6
These concerns have sparked demands to move away from decentralized antitrust 
* Thanks to Hanna Chung for outstanding research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., Commission Decision 2004/134 of 3 July 2001, Case No. COMP/M.2220 – General 
Electric/Honeywell, [2004] O.J. L48/1 (hereinafter ‘GE/Honeywell Commission Decision’).
 2 See, e.g., Case T- 204/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, [2007] E.C.R. II- 03601, paras 231–3 
(requiring Microsoft to design their products to have greater interoperability with competitors); 
Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Confi rms Sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on 
the Tying of Internet Explorer to Windows, 17 January 2009, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference5MEMO/09/15.
 3 See, e.g., Case T- 457/08 R, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, Order of the President of the Court of 
First Instance; Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Imposes Fine of €1.06 Billion on Intel for Abuse 
of Dominant Position; Orders Intel to Cease Illegal Practices, 13 May 2009, available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5IP/09/745&format5HTML&aged50&langu
age5EN&guiLanguage5en (fi nding that Intel off ered rebates to computer manufacturers in return 
for purchasing Intel CPUs exclusively).
 4 Coca- Cola Purchase of Huiyuan Fails to Pass Antimonopoly Review, Xinhua News, 
13  March  2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009- 03/19/content_11036911.
htm.
 5 See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report 103 (2000), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/
icpac/fi nalreport.htm (hereinafter ‘ICPAC Report’).
 6 Frederic M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy 15–16 
(Brookings, 1994); Henrik Horn and James Levinsohn, Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization, 
111 Econ. J. Royal Econ. Soc. 244 (2001).
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enforcement in favor of an international antitrust regime. 7 However, no overarching 
international antitrust regime has been established. Instead, states seek to mitigate the 
negative externalities embedded in decentralized antitrust enforcement largely through 
bilateral cooperation and voluntary multilateral norms.
This chapter describes the key issues underlying international antitrust law.8 Section 
I reviews the recent proliferation of antitrust laws around the world, explaining why 
states adopt antitrust laws and why such laws may diff er across jurisdictions. Section II 
discusses the most important problems embedded in the current system of multijurisdic-
tional antitrust enforcement, focusing on increased transaction costs and uncertainties, 
enforcement confl icts, antitrust protectionism, and global overenforcement of antitrust 
laws. Section III discusses eff orts to mitigate these problems through international 
cooperation. After reviewing the current state of antitrust cooperation, it examines 
why, despite the well- accepted ineffi  ciencies embedded in the current system, no global 
antitrust regime exists. The fi nal section off ers suggestions for the direction of future 
scholarship in the fi eld.
I PROLIFERATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS
Over the last two decades, the number of antitrust jurisdictions has increased dramati-
cally. Today, over 100 countries have adopted domestic antitrust laws. 9 In 1989, 100 
years after the fi rst antitrust law was enacted in Canada, followed by the adoption of the 
Sherman Act in the United States one year later ,10 only 39 countries had antitrust laws.11 
 7 See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, in Competition Laws 
in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy 99, 108–10, 117–20 (Richard 
A. Epstein and Michael S. Greve eds., AEI, 2004); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory 
Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1781, 1805–6 (2000); Philip 
Marsden, Competition Policy for the WTO chs. 4–5 (Cameron May, 2003) (describing propos-
als made by the EU and others for greater international cooperation and harmonization, but gener-
ally taking a critical stance toward them); WTO Competition Working Group, Communication by 
the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/62, 12–13 (5 March 1998), avail-
able at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?language51; International Antitrust Working 
Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, 5 World Trade Materials 126, 129–31 (September 
1993); Ernst- Ulrich Petersmann, Competition- Oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade System: 
Proposals and Trade Options, in Towards WTO Competition Rules 43, 48–9 (Roger Zäch and 
Carlos M. Correa eds, 1999); Robert D. Anderson and Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the 
Future of the Multilateral Trading System, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 531, § IV (2002). 
 8 The concept of ‘international antitrust law’ can be misleading in the sense that there are 
no supranational antitrust rules or international enforcement mechanism; instead, international 
antitrust law refers to ways states seek to regulate cross- border business activity through their 
domestic antitrust laws.
 9 See Keith Hylton and Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Scope of Competition Laws and their Eff ects, 74 Antitrust L.J. 271, 272 (2007); David S. Evans, 
Trustbusting Goes Global, in Trustbusters: Competition Policy Authorities Speak Out 7 
(David S. Evans and Frédéric Jenny eds, Competition Policy International, 2009).
10 Michael Bliss, Another Anti- Trust Tradition: Canadian Anti- Combines Policy, 1889–1910, 47 
Bus. Hist. Rev. 177 (1973).
11 Evans, supra note 9, at 9, 11.
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The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union became a watershed moment for the adoption of 
antitrust laws. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, former communist countries began to 
embrace free markets, adopting domestic antitrust laws in the process.12 The implemen-
tation of antitrust laws by Eastern European countries coincided with the awakening of 
the ‘Asian tigers’ to the ability of free markets and competition to stimulate economic 
growth. Following these developments, almost all developed countries (94%) and almost 
half of all emerging and developing countries in the world (47%) have now enacted 
domestic antitrust laws.13
A Why States Adopt Antitrust Laws
Motivations for adopting domestic antitrust rules vary. Some countries adopt antitrust 
laws because they believe that such laws increase their domestic welfare. Antitrust laws 
foster strong domestic competition, which also tends to increase the competitiveness of 
these same domestic fi rms in global markets. 14 Domestic antitrust regimes can also instill 
a sense of confi dence in a country’s regulatory environment, which helps the country 
attract more international investment.15
At times, countries adopt antitrust statutes in response to a change in the country’s 
economic philosophy. Many developing countries in Latin America and Asia, for 
instance, discovered fi rst- hand the harmfulness of import substitution, negative eff ects 
of price controls, and ineffi  ciencies of state- owned enterprises. These experiences led 
them to pursue market- oriented policies, including enacting antitrust regimes to foster 
effi  ciency and stimulate competition.16 Similarly, several former Soviet satellites wanted 
to distance themselves from the state- driven economic policies by voluntarily embracing 
laws that dismantled state monopolies and established economies with competitive pres-
sures.17 International institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD, 
have enthusiastically supported these endeavors. They have endorsed antitrust policies 
as drivers of economic development and off ered technical assistance to support emerging 
economies’ eff orts to establish antitrust regimes. 18
12 Id. at 9–10.
13 Id. at 11.
14 Fox, supra note 7, at 1784; Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 
636 (Simon & Schuster, 2d ed. 1998) (arguing that domestic competition improves corporations’ 
ability to compete in the global market, rather than encumbering it).
15 Fox, supra note 7, at 1784.
16 See Clive S. Gray and Anthony A. Davis, Competition Policy in Developing Countries 
Pursuing Structural Adjustment, 38 Antitrust Bull. 425, 430–31 (1993); Evans, supra note 9, at 
11–12.
17 Fox, supra note 7, at 1784–5. See Evans, supra note 9, at 9, 12. 
18 Evans, supra note 9, at 11; Jean- François Pons, Deputy Director General of Competition 
for the European Commission, Is it Time for an International Agreement on Antitrust? 12, avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_027_en.pdf (envisioning that the 
International Competition Network (ICN) will cooperate with the WTO, UNCTAD, and the 
OECD who are already established in the fi eld); Merit E. Janow, Developing a Competition Policy: 
A Role for WTO, 13 Consumer Pol’y Rev. 17, 21 (2003) (noting that the OECD has supported 
technical assistance and capacity building in the past); William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: 
Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 403, 
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Other countries adopt antitrust laws more reluctantly, in response to international 
pressure or inducement to secure other benefi ts, including trade deals. International 
institutions’ approach to lending support, for instance, has ranged from persuasion 
and assistance to imposing the requirement to adopt antitrust laws as a condition for 
loans and other funding. Indonesia and Zambia, for instance, adopted antitrust laws as 
part of structural adjustment programs that were fi nanced by the IMF and the World 
Bank.19 Several countries have adopted antitrust laws in response to their trading 
partners’ demands to do so. For instance, Guatemala, Singapore, and Jordan enacted 
antitrust laws as a condition for securing a free trade agreement with the United States.20 
The EU employs the strategy of trade conditionality even more frequently and eff ec-
tively. Aspiring Member States or states seeking trade agreements with the EU have to 
adopt antitrust laws as a condition for the trade agreement or in preparation for their 
membership.21
Some countries choose not to adopt antitrust laws. The reasons vary, but given that 
countries without antitrust laws are predominantly the least developed economies, an 
obvious reason is that antitrust enforcement is costly.22 Adopting and enforcing anti-
trust laws requires institutional capacity, technical expertise, and economic resources 
that these countries lack. Even if an economic argument can be made that competitive 
markets support developing countries’ quest for economic growth and higher levels 
of development,23 antitrust laws may not be a regulatory priority given the limited 
407 (1997–1998) (observing that the support of advisory bodies and multinational donors such 
as the World Bank, the OECD, and UNCTAD have played an active role in shaping developing 
countries’ newly adopted laws).
19 Janow, supra note 18, at 18 and n.15 (reporting that the World Bank/IMF conditioned 
Indonesia’s aid to the establishment of a domestic competition law); UNCTAD, Report of the 
Third United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices para. 63, U.N. Doc. TD/
RBP/CONF.4/15 (1996), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/511/11/
PDF/G9651111.pdf (reporting that Zambia had enacted a statute establishing a Competition 
Commission as a part of its World Bank-fi nanced ‘structural adjustment programme’); Eleanor 
M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and 
Indonesia, 41 Harv. Int’l L.J. 579, 589 (2000).
20 Evans, supra note 9, at 5.
21 Evans, supra note 9, at 10, 12 (noting that countries such as Finland and Sweden enacted 
competition laws in order to join the European Union); see Mark R.A. Palim, The Worldwide 
Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis, 43 Antitrust Bull. 105, 120, 121 n.51 (1998) 
(noting that many current members of the European Community, such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Poland, adopted competition policies as a part of trade agreements 
before they were members).
22 See Fox, supra note 7, at 1794.
23 Porter, supra note 14, at 636; Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: 
The Other Path, 13 Sw. J.L. and Trade Am. 211, 212–13 (2006–2007) (suggesting that, although 
developing nations stand to gain economic benefi ts from adopting antitrust laws, one should not 
expect the antitrust law of those nations to be identical to the law of developed nations, since 
developing nations have other pressing priorities, such as poverty); Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, What 
Could Anti- Trust in the OECD Do for Development?, para. 3 (Institute of Social Studies Working 
Paper No. 473, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id51331830 
(summarizing empirical studies documenting the costs that anticompetitive behavior imposes on 
developing nations).
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 government resources and the number of challenges these countries face.24 Also, devel-
oped countries with small, open markets may conclude that antitrust laws would only 
yield marginal gains for them. Exposure to foreign competition may be suffi  cient to make 
domestic markets competitive.25 This is a reason why Singapore and Hong Kong have 
taken such a long time to consider antitrust laws in earnest.26
B The Global Reach of Local Antitrust Laws
Given that over 100 countries have antitrust laws, a critical question is to determine which 
laws apply to which international business activity. The jurisdictional reach of domestic 
antitrust laws is often determined according to an ‘eff ects doctrine’. This doctrine entails 
that a state can apply its antitrust laws to any anticompetitive conduct that has an eff ect 
on its domestic market. 27 No state can exercise exclusive jurisdiction in antitrust mat-
ters.28 Thus, if a multinational corporation operates in several markets, it is likely to be 
subject to multiple antitrust laws simultaneously.
The United States and the EU have frequently resorted to extra- territorial enforcement 
of their antitrust laws. 29 The early antitrust jurisprudence in the United States denied the 
principle of extra- territoriality. In the American Banana case, the US Supreme Court 
held that US antitrust laws only extend to acts that take place within the United States’ 
borders. 30 Gradually, however, the Supreme Court moved away from the territoriality 
24 Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure, Financial Times (London), 23 September 2003, 
at 16 (‘It is absurd to push, as the EU has done, to impose rules in complex areas such as competition 
and investment on countries so poor that some cannot even aff ord WTO diplomatic representation’).
25 Fox, supra note 7, at 1794. 
26 As of date, Hong Kong has yet to enact an antitrust law. See Grace Li and Angus Young, 
Competition Laws and Policies in China and Hong Kong: A Tale of Two Regulatory Journeys, 7 J. 
Int’l Trade L. and Pol’y 186 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id51421792 (manuscript at 15). Singapore did not enact its Competition Act until 2004. Thomas 
K. Cheng, A Tale of Two Competition Law Regimes: The Telecom- Sector Competition Regulation 
in Hong Kong and Singapore, 30 World Compet. 501, 502 (2007).
27 See Wolfgang Kerber, The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law, in 
Economic Law as an Economic Good: Its Rule Function in the Competition of Systems 
38 (Karl Meessen ed., 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id51392163; Wolfgang Kerber and Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission 
Impossible?, in Competition Laws in Conflict, supra note 7, at 45; Fox, supra note 7, at 1789.
28 In this respect, antitrust diff ers from areas such as corporate law, where the internal aff airs 
of the corporation are regulated exclusively by the laws of the state where the corporation was 
established. This creates a very diff erent dynamic and incentives for regulatory competition.
29 The United States and the European Union apply their antitrust laws to the conduct of 
foreign corporations as long the conduct has had an ‘eff ect’ on their domestic market. See, e.g., 
United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); Case T- 102/96, Gencor Ltd v. Comm’n, 
[1999] E.C.R. II- 00753, paras. 92, 96 (CFI); Federal Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(FTAIA), 96 Stat. 1246, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). See, e.g., Damien Geradin, Marc Reysen, and David 
Henry, Extraterritoriality, Comity and Cooperation in EC Competition Law 4–7 (July 2008), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id51175003; Eleanor M. Fox, National 
Law, Global Markets, and Hartford: Eyes Wide Shut, 68 Antitrust L.J. 73, §§ IV–V (2000). 
30 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 US 347, 356, 359 (1909); Andrew T. Guzman, 
International Competition Law, in Research Handbook in International Economic Law 419 
(Andrew T. Guzman and Alan O. Sykes eds., Edward Elgar, 2007).
M2832 - ELHAUGE TEXT.indd   287 26/01/2012   16:25
Einer R. Elhauge - 9781848440807
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/09/2016 02:56:26PM
via NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SHARING or POSTING
288  Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law
principle and focused on the eff ects of foreign conduct on the domestic market.31 The 
landmark case of extra- territoriality in the United States was the Hartford Fire case, 
where the Supreme Court affi  rmed that ‘the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct 
that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial eff ect in the United 
States’. The Court held that considerations of international comity do not prevent US 
courts from attaching jurisdiction in cases where there is no true confl ict between US and 
foreign law.32 Most recently, the Supreme Court revisited the question of extra- territorial 
application of antitrust laws in the Empagran case. Invoking the principle of international 
comity, it limited the extra- territorial reach of the Sherman Act by holding that the Act 
did not extend to cases where a foreign plaintiff  suff ers an injury that is independent of 
any domestic harm.33
Notwithstanding its historically more cautious stand towards antitrust extra- 
territoriality, the EU today is prepared to extend its antitrust jurisdiction to foreign 
conduct.34 The European Court of Justice re- affi  rmed the extra- territorial application 
of European antitrust laws in the Wood Pulp case.35 The Commission has also exercised 
jurisdiction over mergers involving foreign companies whenever merging parties have 
exceeded the EU’s revenue- based thresholds for notifi cation.36 However, many other 
31 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (‘it is settled 
law – as “Limited” itself agrees – that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not 
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders 
which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize’). Although 
this is a Second Circuit case, it has the binding eff ect of a Supreme Court case because the Court 
lacked quorum and had to refer the case. See id. at 416. The Alcoa case held that the Sherman 
Act extends to foreign conduct if such conduct ‘were intended to aff ect imports and did aff ect 
them’. Id. at 444. But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 549 
F.2d 597, 611–12 (9th Cir. 1976) (softening the Alcoa eff ects test with a requirement that courts 
must weigh the interests of foreign states); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
797 (1993) (acknowledging that comity considerations may apply, but only where there is a ‘true 
confl ict’).
32 Implicitly, the Court also re- affi  rmed the simultaneous applicability of multiple antitrust 
laws, and the requirement that an individual must comply with all those laws absent true confl ict. 
True confl ict exists only when one jurisdiction requires (as opposed to permits) a conduct that is 
prohibited by another jurisdiction. In most cases, a company can therefore ensure its compliance 
with multiple antitrust laws by simply conforming to the strictest jurisdiction. This phenomenon 
of ‘strictest regime wins’ is discussed infra.
33 F. Hoff man-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); see also Ronald W. 
Davis, Empagran and International Cartels: A Comity of Errors, 19 Antitrust 58, 61 (2004); Victor 
P. Goldberg, The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick and a Hard Place 11 (Center for 
Law and Economic Studies at the Columbia University School of Law Working Paper No. 345, 
2009); Alvin K. Klevorick and Alan O. Sykes, United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence 
of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran, 3 J. Competit. L. and Econ. 309 
(2007). 
34 Geradin et al., supra note 29, at 4.
35 Cases 89/85, 114/85, 116–117/85, 125–129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Comm’n (Wood 
Pulp), [1993] E.C.R. I- 1307, para. 62; Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Ind. v. Comm’n (Dyestuff s), 
[1972] E.C.R. 619, paras 125–42.
36 Guzman, supra note 30, at 423. See, e.g., Commission Decision 97/26/EC, Case IV/M.619 
(Gencor/Lonrho), [1997] O.J. L 11/30 para. 219; Commission Decision of 30 July 1997, Case 
IV/M.877 (Boeing/McDonnell Douglas), [1997] O.J. L 336/16 paras 8, 124; GE/Honeywell 
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 jurisdictions beyond the United States and the EU have recognized the legitimacy of 
applying antitrust laws to the conduct of foreign fi rms as long as some anticompetitive 
eff ect is felt on the domestic market of that country.37 China’s recent decision to exert 
jurisdiction over Coca- Cola during its attempted acquisition of Chinese juice company 
Huiyuan off ers an example of this.38 India, departing from its previous practice of 
denying extra- territorial application of its antitrust laws, has also revised its antitrust laws 
to embrace the eff ects doctrine. 39
C Why Antitrust Laws Differ Across Jurisdictions
In principle, all states could enforce the same antitrust laws. The basic economic theory 
informing antitrust enforcement applies regardless of the particular market or the spe-
cifi c situation.40 Most states’ antitrust laws also purport to promote the same goal: con-
sumer welfare. Yet, a closer look at the laws and their enforcement reveals remarkable 
 diff erences across the jurisdictions.
Substantive laws may often appear similar, given that most antitrust jurisdictions have 
chosen to adopt either US- or EU- style antitrust laws.41 However, many states, while 
sharing the fundamental policy goal of consumer welfare, seek to pursue a wider set of 
objectives through their antitrust laws. These may include the advancement of public 
interest or ‘fair’ competition, the protection of small- and medium- sized enterprises, 
employment, or more equitable distribution of ownership. 42 Even where the substantive 
Commission Decision, para. 567. For all of these decisions, the legal basis of the decision came from 
EC Merger Regulation. Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, [2004] O.J. L24, art. 8(3).
37 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 415 report-
ers’ note 9 (1987).
38 See Sundeep Tucker and Jamil Anderlini, China’s Block on Coke Bid Raises Alarm Over 
M&A, Financial Times, 19 March, 2009, at 16; Zhou Xin and Michael Wei, China’s Statement 
on Rejecting Coke’s Huiyuan Bid, Reuters, 18 March 2009 (quoting a translation of the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce’s decision to reject Coca- Cola’s bid for Huiyuan).
39 See Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment, 4 J. 
Compet. L. and Econ. 609, 624, 627 (2008) (noting that the 1969 Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act was interpreted not to have extra- territorial application, but that the new 
Competition Act of 2002 will apply to any practices that have ‘an anticompetitive eff ect in India’); 
Rahul Singh, Shifting Paradigms, Changing Contexts: Need for a New Competition Law in India, 
8 J. Corp. L. Stud. 143, 153 (2008); S. Chakravarthy, Competition Act, 2002: The Approach, in A 
Functional Competition Policy for India para. 3.10 (Pradeep S. Mehta ed., 2006).
40 Evans, supra note 9, at 8.
41 See Fox, supra note 7, at 1799 (suggesting that the EU and the United States are locked in 
a competition to export their competition laws and become the dominant antitrust model for the 
world).
42 See Dina I. Waked, Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption 
and Its Implications for International Competition Law, 1 Global Antitrust Rev. 69, 82 (2008) 
(noting that South Africa, for example, has a broader range of competition law objectives, includ-
ing ‘the promotion of a more equitable spread of ownership’ and ‘the interests of workers’); Michael 
J. Trebilcock and Edward M. Iacobucci, National Treatment and Extraterritoriality: Defi ning the 
Domains of Trade and Antitrust Policy, in Competition Laws in Conflict, supra note 7, at 167 
(explaining that Canada may consider producer welfare in addition to consumer welfare); Eleanor 
M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 4–5 (1997) ( suggesting 
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rules are similar, the actual enforcement (or, at times, nonenforcement) of those laws can 
lead to diff erent outcomes in practice. Also, remedial options diff er from one country 
to another: some countries choose to criminalize anticompetitive conduct; others prefer 
resorting to administrative fi nes and injunctive relief. 43
Scholars have examined sources for divergence in states’ antitrust laws. Some suggest 
that the size and openness of the economy determine the type of antitrust law that is 
optimal for a country. 44 Also, market structures and prevailing conditions for coop-
eration diff er, at times calling for dissimilar antitrust laws. This may be a result of the 
country’s history of state- owned businesses, or a refl ection of the government’s adherence 
to a diff erent economic ideology.45 Antitrust laws are also likely to refl ect the level of eco-
nomic development in the country.46 Countries with abundant resources, well- established 
institutions, and technical expertise are more likely to be able to aff ord sophisticated anti-
trust regimes. Finally, the domestic political economy is dissimilar across the countries. 
The prospect of political rents leads the government to pursue diff erent antitrust policies, 
depending on the relative infl uence of various interest groups in any given country. 47
The need to explain the diff erences among countries’ antitrust laws has give rise to a 
‘comparative antitrust law’ scholarship. Comparative analysis of antitrust laws has thus 
far focused on US and EU antitrust enforcement. 48 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin’s 
textbook, Global Antitrust Law and Economics, provides the most comprehensive com-
parative discussion of these two jurisdictions. 49 After discussing the similarities and 
the diff erences across the entire fi eld of antitrust and merger control, they confi rm that 
that the EU has a ‘fuller [antitrust] agenda’ that involves social policies); Nathan Bush, The PRC 
Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, 7 Antitrust Source 1, 2 (2007), 
available at www.abanet.org/antitrust/at- source/07/10/Oct07- Bush10- 18f.pdf (noting that the pri-
orities of Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law are ambiguous because art. 1 lists so many: effi  ciency, 
consumer interests, fair market competition, the public interest, and the healthy development of 
the socialist market economy); Bhattacharjea, supra note 39, at 624, 627 (observing that public 
interest has been a consideration in past Indian competition cases, and noting that the clause in 
the new Competition Act ‘keeping in view the economic development of the country’ provides a 
potentially dangerous loophole).
43 Diane P. Wood, Cooperation and Convergence in International Antitrust, in Competition 
Laws in Conflict, supra note 7, at 183. Cf. infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
44 Wood, supra note 43, at 181–2; Michal S. Gal, Size Does Matter: The Eff ects of Market Size 
on Optimal Competition Policy, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1437, 1441, 1450–67 (2001); see Fox, supra note 
7, at 1794.
45 See Evans, supra note 9, at 8 (surmising that it is not unreasonable to treat fi rms with diff erent 
historical and economic circumstances diff erently). 
46 See discussion infra.
47 Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 383, 392 (2007).
48 See generally Handbook of Research in Trans- Atlantic Antitrust (Philip Marsden 
ed., Edward Elgar, 2006); Alberto Pera, Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and 
EC Antitrust Law, 4 Eur. Competit. J. 127, 150–59 (2008); Eleanor M. Fox, The Competition 
Law of the European Union in Comparative Perspective: Cases and Materials (West, 2009); 
Alan J. Devlin, Exploring the Source of Transatlantic Antitrust Divergence 25 (bepress Legal Series 
Working Paper No. 1108, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1108/.
49 Einer R. Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Antitrust Law and Economics 
(Thomson West, 2007). 
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increasing convergence is taking place between the two key antitrust jurisdictions.50 Both 
the United States and the EU seek to maximize consumer welfare as the primary goal 
of antitrust enforcement.51 The EU is also increasingly embracing the economic analysis 
of antitrust law, adopting analytical tools closer to those employed by the US courts and 
antitrust agencies.52 The antitrust doctrine is also similar, in particular with respect to 
collusive behavior or horizontal mergers.53
Still, some important diff erences remain. The EU employs its antitrust laws to further 
the creation of a common European market. This way, it ensures that the anticompetitive 
practices of private enterprise do not re- erect trade barriers within the common market. 54 
The EU also intervenes more frequently, believing less in the ability of the markets to 
50 Id. at 1100.
51 Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition, Review of Insurance Block 
Exemption Regulation, Keynote Speech at the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation Conference, 
2 June 2009, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5SPEECH/
09/278&format5HTML&aged50&language5EN&guiLanguage5en (declaring that improving 
consumer welfare is the most important goal of the Commission); Mario Monti, European 
Commissioner for Competition, A Reformed Competition Policy: Achievements and Challenges 
for the Future, Speech before the Center for European Reform, 28 October 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5SPEECH/04/477&format5HTML&ag
ed51&language5EN&guiLanguage5en (declaring that ‘consumer interest’ has been confi rmed 
as the main goal of competition policy). See Pera, supra note 48, at 127, 140–41 (observing that the 
more ‘objective’ economics- based analytical approach looking at consumer welfare has increas-
ingly gained support, both in the United States and the EU); Devlin, supra note 48, at 11. However, 
the EU has goals other than maximizing consumer welfare; it also seeks to develop and maintain a 
single, integrated market. See Devlin, supra note 48, at 25.
52 See, e.g., Monti, supra note 51 (acknowledging that the trend in competition policy is to 
ground decisions in sound microeconomic reasoning, and making commitments toward that end); 
Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the US Department 
of Justice, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in the Application of Antitrust to 
Intellectual Property, Remarks at the George Mason Law Review Symposium, 6 October 2004, 
available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205712.htm (speaking on ‘reaching consensus on 
antitrust enforcement strategies that are grounded in sound economic theory’ as a central goal of 
convergence and noting the progress that has been made between the United States and the EU); 
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the US Department 
of Justice, Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence and Cooperation, Remarks before 
the American Bar Association Fall Forum, 7 November 2002, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/200446.htm (claiming that the EU and the United States have made ‘substantial 
progress’ toward convergence and noting favorably Commissioner Mario Monti’s plan to hire a 
new chief economist as a step which will bring ‘more rigorous economic analysis’ to EU decision- 
making). See also Roger Van den Bergh, The Diffi  cult Reception of Economic Analysis in European 
Competition Law, in Post- Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law 34 (Antonio Cucinotta, 
Roberto Pardolesi, and Roger Van den Bergh eds, Edward Elgar, 2002); Pera, supra note 48, at 
140–41; Devlin, supra note 48, at 38, 40.
53 For a standard book on European antitrust doctrine, see generally Bellamy and Child: 
European Community Law of Competition (Peter Roth and Vivien Rose eds, Oxford, 6th ed. 
2007); Richard Whish, Competition Law (Oxford, 6th ed. 2008).
54 See European Commission, XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999, 19 (2000) (explain-
ing that the two principal objectives of EU competition law are the maintenance of competitive 
markets and the development of a single market). Also, social considerations such as promotion of 
employment or protection of small enterprises still play a role at the margins of the EU antitrust 
analysis. See Fox, supra note 42, at 4 n.17, 12. 
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 self- correct.55 As such, the EU is likely to err on the side of making ‘false positive’ deci-
sions, whereas the United States is likely to err on the side of ‘false negatives’, fearing 
incorrect intervention. These transatlantic divergences are most notable in the regulation 
of unilateral conduct by dominant companies.56 The EU is more likely to bring cases 
against dominant companies than to rely on the market.57 Another key area of divergence 
is in the treatment of vertical restraints. Because the EU uses antitrust laws as a tool to 
facilitate a common market in Europe,58 the EU is particularly hostile towards territorial 
restraints that threaten to partition the common market.59 Finally, the GE/Honeywell case 
exposed critical transatlantic diff erences towards vertical and conglomerate mergers. 60
While the substantive scope of antitrust in the EU appears to be wider than in the 
United States, it is not clear that corporations incur higher fi nancial costs for complying 
with the EU’s antitrust laws. 61 Assume that the narrower scope of US antitrust laws, 
together with the fear of ‘false positive’ decisions, causes the US antitrust agencies to 
underenforce their antitrust laws. Assume also that the more extensive scope of antitrust 
laws, together with the fear of ‘false negative’ decisions, causes the EU antitrust authori-
55 Gunnar Niels and Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU – 
Converging or Diverging Paths?, 49 Antitrust Bull. 1, 15 (2004). See Nuno Garoupa and Thomas 
S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 
Ala. L. Rev. 1555, 1579 (2008) (noting that those in the antitrust fi eld in the United States have 
been far more receptive to free- market classical liberalism than those in the EU); Andreas Kirsch 
and William Weesner, Can Antitrust Law Control E- Commerce? A Comparative Analysis in Light 
of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. and Poly. 297, 308 (2006).
56 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 255; see also id. at 1100 (listing the main dif-
ferences between the United States and the EU). The United States and the EU diff er on whether 
excessive pricing by dominant companies should be considered anticompetitive; whether above- 
cost predatory pricing should be banned; whether a below- cost predatory pricing claim requires 
the showing of recoupment of predatory losses; when a dominant company has a duty to deal; 
and, fi nally, under which circumstances loyalty- and volume- based discounts should be allowed.
57 The European Commission’s recent decisions against Microsoft and Intel are illustrative of 
this. See generally Commission Decision 2004/900 of 24 March 2004, Case No. COMP/C- 3/37.792 
– Microsoft, [2003] O.J. L1; Commission Decision of 13 May 2009, Case No. COMP/37.990 – Intel 
(not yet published).
58 XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999, supra note 54, at 19.
59 Id.
60 Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped – A Story of the 
Politics of Convergence, in Antitrust Stories 343–7 (Eleanor M. Fox and Daniel A. Crane eds., 
Foundation, 2007) (describing the fallout between the US Department of Justice and the EU 
Commission shortly after the GE/Honeywell merger had been shot down). However, develop-
ments since the GE/Honeywell case suggest that the diff erences raised in GE/Honeywell may not be 
as extreme as originally supposed. See id. at 353–5, 358–60 (arguing that EU rhetoric has largely 
converged to be compatible with the US school of thought, and suggesting that the GE/Honeywell 
decision might be an outlier in the long run); Case C- 12/03 P, Comm’n v. Tetra Laval, [2005] E.C.R. 
I- 1113 (involving another conglomerate merger, but resulting in annulment). For a recent attempt 
to clarify the European Union’s stance on conglomerate mergers, see Commission Guidelines 
2008/C 265/07, Assessment of Non- Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [2008] O.J. C265 6 (EC).
61 David S. Evans, Why Diff erent Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same 
Antitrust Rules 8–9 (16 February 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id51342797.
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ties to overenforce their antitrust laws. Despite these diff erences, critical procedural 
diff erences in the two antitrust jurisdictions may off set any assumed underenforcement 
in the United States and overenforcement in the EU. European antitrust law is enforced 
by the European Commission and national competition authorities of the EU Member 
States. Private plaintiff s have thus far had a limited, almost nonexistent,62 right to sue 
corporations for their antitrust violations in European courts.63 In contrast, private 
plaintiff s bring 95% of the federal antitrust cases in the United States.64 The volume of 
antitrust litigation is therefore much higher in the United States.65 Antitrust remedies 
diff er as well: US agencies and courts employ more aggressive remedies, including impris-
onment and treble damages, for antitrust violations.66 These tools are not available for 
the European Commission and European courts.67 Consequently, despite the diff erences 
in substantive antitrust laws, the US and the EU antitrust laws may deter anticompeti-
tive behavior at similar levels, given the off setting eff ects of the procedural and remedial 
choices made.
Another focus of comparative antitrust law scholarship has been developing countries. 
A debate has emerged as to assess whether developing countries should adopt diff erent 
types of antitrust laws because of their developmental needs. Some argue that antitrust 
laws that are optimal for developing countries are diff erent from those that are optimal 
for developed countries.68 Because of their less effi  cient production, developing countries 
62 Id. at 8 n.23 (reporting that there have been 12 successful actions and 12 unsuccessful actions 
in the European Union).
63 See Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 
COM(2008)165 fi nal, 2–3 (2 April 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
actionsdamages/fi les_white_paper/whitepaper_en.pdf (explaining that the ‘right of victims to 
compensation’ is guaranteed under Community law, but that in practice private victims rarely 
obtain reparation). However, the EU plans to expand the role of private litigation in enforcing 
its competition rules. See id. See also Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition 
Matters, Private Litigation as a Key Complement to Public Enforcement of Competition Rules 
and the First Conclusions on the Implementation of the New Merger Regulation, Speech before the 
International Bar Association 8th Annual Competition Conference, 17 September 2004, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5SPEECH/04/403&format5PDF&ag
ed51&language5EN&guiLanguage5en. A few scholars have weighed in on the role of private 
litigation in EU antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, The Relationship Between Public 
Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32 World Compet. (2009); Christopher 
Cook, Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law in Member State Courts: Experience to Date 
and the Path Ahead, 4 Compet. Pol’y Int’l 3 (2008); Vincent Smith, Will Europe Provide Eff ective 
Redress for Cartel Victims?, 4 Compet. Pol’y Int’l 65 (2008); Assimakis P. Komninos, The Road to 
the Commission’s White Paper for Damages Actions: Where We Came From, 4 Compet. Pol’y Int’l 
81 (2008); Renato Nazzini and Ali Nikpay, Private Actions in EC Competition Law, 4 Compet. 
Pol’y Int’l 107 (2008).
64 Evans, supra note 61, at 8.
65 Id.
66 Evans, supra note 9, at 8.
67 Most countries do not impose criminal penalties for antitrust violations. Notable exceptions 
include the United States and the United Kingdom. See id.
68 See Waked, supra note 42, at 82; Paul E. Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Does 
Not Need, 15 Regulation 20, 21 (1992); Paul E. Godek, A Chicago- School Approach to Antitrust 
for Developing Economies, 43 Antitrust Bull. 274, 262 (1998); Bernard Hoekman and Petros 
C. Mavroidis, Economic Development: Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization 8 
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may need to focus on productive effi  ciency rather than allocative effi  ciency in assess-
ing competitive eff ects on their markets. 69 Also, economies of scale may also be more 
important for developing countries.70 This, some would argue, justifi es higher levels of 
concentration in their markets. Developing country markets may support only few fi rms, 
which need to be allowed to acquire market power in order to innovate and compete 
against large developed country fi rms.71 Critics doubt the categorical presumption that 
economies of scale require more concentrated markets.72 They also question whether lax 
antitrust rules and the protection of monopolists lead to enhanced competitiveness and 
innovations in these countries.73 Higher levels of concentration increase the risk of collu-
sion or abuse of market power, suggesting that developing countries need more, not less, 
antitrust enforcement.74 Empirical studies have also shown a positive correlation between 
antitrust enforcement and high GDP, further indicating that antitrust enforcement helps 
rather than impedes the goals of development. 75
Most recently, the antitrust community has turned its attention to developments in 
China. After 13 years of drafting, China adopted an Antimonopoly Law in August 
2008. The new law entered into force a year later. The law states consumer welfare and 
effi  ciency as its goal. However, the new law also purports to advance ‘fair market com-
petition’, ‘public interest’ and ‘the healthy development of socialist market economy’.76 
It is unclear which priorities will come to dominate the enforcement. The legislative 
history revealed mixed motivations: some domestic groups favored the law as a tool 
to control the conduct of state- owned enterprises and to abolish trade barriers among 
diff erent regions within China; others saw the new law as an opportunity to chal-
lenge foreign multinationals that are increasingly controlling the Chinese economy. 
China’s fi rst year of enforcement has reinforced concerns that the law will be used as 
a tool for protectionism. Most prominently, China prohibited Coca- Cola’s proposed 
(World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2917, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id5636279; A.E. Rodriguez and Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy 
for Reforming Economies, 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 311, 320–22 (1996) (noting that several scholars 
have argued against applying the antitrust law of developed countries to developing countries, but 
also concluding that antitrust law has become an accepted part of developing countries’ policies); 
Richard A. Posner, 100 Years of Antitrust, Wall St. J., 29 June 1990, at A12; Elhauge, supra note 
49, at 1206–8; Gal, supra note 44, at 1441–2.
69 Ajit Singh and Rahule Dhumale, Competition Policy, Development, and Developing Countries, 
in What Global Economic Crisis? 133–4 (Philip Arestis, Michelle Baddeley, and John McCombie 
eds, Palgrave, 2001); Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1207.
70 Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1206 (discussing this yet questioning the basis of 
the argument).
71 Waked, supra note 42, at 86, 89. See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1206.
72 Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1207.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1206.
75 See World Bank, World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets 
141 (2002). See generally Michael W. Nicholson, An Antitrust Law Index for Empirical Analysis of 
International Competition Policy, 4 J. Compet. L. and Econ. 1009 (2008).
76 See Anti- Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Presidential Order No. 
68 (National People’s Congress, 2007, 2008), www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009- 02/20/
content_1471587.htm (PRC), art. 1; Bush, supra note 42, at 2.
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acquisition of a Chinese juice maker, Huiyuan, in March 2009.77 A few months earlier, 
China imposed extensive conditions before approving the merger between two foreign 
brewers, American Anheuser- Busch and Belgian InBev.78 These decisions, together with 
a similarly interventionist decision in the deal between Mitsubishi Rayon and Lucite 
International,79 indicate that China’s new law may indeed depart from antitrust laws of 
more established jurisdictions.
Assuming that all states have adopted antitrust laws that are optimal for their country 
(in maximizing either their domestic consumer welfare or their domestic total welfare), 
the diff erences across antitrust jurisdictions refl ect legitimate policy choices. Those dif-
ferences would therefore be diffi  cult or costly to reverse without reducing the welfare of 
individual countries. Indeed, it is possible that no one- size- fi ts- all antitrust law exists. 80 
Yet, the current system consisting of multiple, overlapping, and often inconsistent anti-
trust laws creates several externalities that fail to advance global welfare. These problems 
are discussed next.
II PROBLEM OF DECENTRALIZED ANTITRUST REGIMES
A Increase in Transaction Costs and Conflicts
1 Costs of compliance with multiple antitrust laws
Decentralized antitrust enforcement increases transaction costs, causes delays, and 
raises the likelihood of confl icting decisions.81 Multijurisdictional merger review off ers 
a pertinent example of this. Over 70 countries today have domestic merger control 
regimes, imposing overlapping notifi cation obligations on merging parties. The sheer 
number of jurisdictions reviewing the transaction increases the costs of compliance. 
Further costs stem from inconsistent procedural requirements and confl icting substantive 
standards which diff erent antitrust agencies use when assessing the competitive eff ects of 
transactions.
The costs associated with multijurisdictional merger review can be divided into 
three major categories. First, parties must expend management time and legal fees to 
 ascertain  whether a notifi cation in a particular jurisdiction is required.82 Opaque or 
77 China Rejects Coke Bid for Juice Maker, New York Times, 18 March 2009, available at 
www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/03/18/business/AP- AS- China- Coca- Cola- Huiyuan.html?dbk.
78 Li Jing, MOFCOM Approves InBev, AB Merger, China Daily, 19 November 2008, www.
chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2008- 11/19/content_7219360.htm.
79 See Mitsubishi/Lucite Deal Approved with ‘Conditions’, China Law and Practice, 
May  2009, www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/2194925/MitsubishiLucite- deal- approved- 
with- conditions.html.
80 See Wood, supra note 43, at 179–82. Cf. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global 
Competition Policy, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 478, 504 (2000).
81 Tarullo, supra note 80, at 482; Guzman, supra note 7, at 100–101; Guzman, supra note 30, 
at 428–9.
82 International Competition Network, Report on the Costs and Burdens of Multijurisdictional 
Merger Review 10–12 (November 2004), available at www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
media/library/conference_1st_naples_2002/costburd.pdf (hereinafter ‘ICN Report’).
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diffi  cult- to- interpret fi ling requirements in a given jurisdiction may magnify these costs.83 
Second, the process of  notifying an upcoming merger to multiple authorities entails fi ling 
fees, legal fees, document production fees, and possible translation fees.84 These fees are 
particularly high in jurisdictions that require parties to submit extensive information 
even for mergers that have a trivial eff ect on the market.85 Finally, multiple notifi cation 
requirements may lead to costly delays in implementing the merger.86 These delays lead 
to a loss of effi  ciencies that motivated the transaction. At worst, they can be fatal to a 
particularly time- sensitive transaction.87
Many commentators have asserted that the proliferation of merger control regimes 
imposes signifi cant costs on merging parties.88 Antitrust agencies across jurisdictions have 
conceded that multiple fi ling requirements function as a ‘tax’ on international mergers, 
perhaps discouraging or delaying effi  cient transactions.89 Until recently, however, there 
was little empirical evidence on the actual magnitude of the costs associated with mul-
tijurisdictional merger review. Diane Wood and Richard Whish, in their study entitled 
Merger Cases in the Real World, made an important early attempt to account for the costs 
of multijurisdictional merger fi ling.90 Another noteworthy study examining the associ-
ated costs is the 2000 ICPAC report to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust, which examined the eff ects of globalization on US antitrust policy, 
including the costs of multijurisdictional merger review.91
In 2002, the International Bar Association and the American Bar Association com-
missioned a study from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to quantify the costs of multijuris-
dictional merger review (‘Multijurisdictional Merger Survey’ or ‘Survey’).92 As the fi rst 
serious at tempt to measure the costs of multijurisdictional review, the Survey drew from a 
sample of 62 international M&A deals from 2000 to mid- 2002, involving 382  notifi cations 
83 Id. at 10–11; ICPAC Report, supra note 5, at 91.
84 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 7.
85 Id. at 14.
86 Guzman, supra note 30, at 429.
87 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 16. 
88 See generally ICPAC Report, supra note 5; ICN Report, supra note 82.
89 See Konrad von Finckenstein, Commissioner of Competition, Canadian Competition 
Bureau, International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or Multilateralism?, Address to joint 
meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and Canadian Bar Association 
National Competition Law Section, 31 May 2001, available at www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Canada/
Policy/1a.htm; Charles A. James, Perspectives on the International Competition Network, 16 
Antitrust 36 (2001); Mario Monti, Competition Commissioner, European Commission, The EU 
Views on Global Competition Forum, Address before the American Bar Association, 29 March 
2001, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5SPEECH/01/147&fo
rmat5PDF&aged51&language5EN&guiLanguage5en.
90 Richard Whish and Diane Wood, Merger Cases in the Real World: A Study of 
Merger Control Procedures (OECD, 1994). The study reports several merger investigations 
and their outcomes in detail, describing the nature of the transaction, the steps taken during the 
proceeding, and the parties’ reactions; it then proceeds to analyse the factors that aff ect cooperation 
and propose suggestions for strengthening cooperation across jurisdictions.
91 ICPAC Report, supra note 5.
92 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, A Tax On Mergers? Surveying the Costs to Business of 
Multi- Jurisdictional Merger Review (June 2003), available at www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/pwc_mergers.
pdf (hereinafter ‘PWC Report’).
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in 49 jurisdictions. 93 Though the Survey’s small sample size and overrepresentation of 
European deals limits its applicability, the Survey provides an important empirical foun-
dation for the discussion on the costs of decentralized antitrust enforcement.94
The Survey confi rmed that the current system of multijurisdictional review imposes addi-
tional costs on fi rms in terms of time and money. It found that a typical international merger 
requires parties to fi le with six diff erent antitrust agencies. On average, a multijurisdictional 
merger review took seven months to complete. A regression analysis showed that the 
duration of the review process for any given merger is a function of the number of jurisdic-
tions reviewing the transaction.95 As for monetary costs, the Survey found that an average 
merger generated €3.3 million (US $4.7 million) in external merger review costs.96 If an 
antitrust authority issued a ‘second request’, these costs increased to €5.4 million (US $7.8 
million). The results indicated that the number of required fi lings was the most important 
determinant of the total external costs in the absence of economies of scale. By contrast, the 
primary determinant of the extent of the total internal costs was the transaction’s value,97 
since economies of scale do lower the internal costs associated with the review process.
The Survey also compared the costs associated with multijurisdictional merger review 
to the value of an average merger, fi nding that the average external transaction costs of 
reviewing a merger constitute 0.11% of the total costs of the average deal. Transaction 
costs of this magnitude are unlikely to deter transnational mergers. Still, these costs 
impose a ‘relatively small, but regressive tax’ on international mergers.98 As long as 
the states maintain a decentralized merger review process, this regressive tax cannot be 
entirely eliminated. Thus, international eff orts to foster cooperation among antitrust 
agencies have primarily focused on identifying99 and eradicating100 the ‘unnec essary’ 
 93 See id. at 10–11, 44.
 94 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 5.
 95 PWC Report, supra note 92, at 34.
 96 Id. at 42. These represented approximately 85% of the overall costs of the merger review for 
the merging parties, comprising legal fees (65%), fi ling fees (19%), and other advisory fees (14%). 
Id. at 4.
 97 To measure the internal costs of the merger, the Survey looked at the time the management 
dedicated to the review process, measured in person- weeks. For Phase I reviews, average internal 
costs amounted to 28 person- weeks, whereas the costs increased to 120 person- weeks for Phase II 
reviews.
 98 See PWC Report, supra note 92, at 4. The ‘regressive tax’ is likely to have a disproportion-
ately adverse impact on relatively small- value transactions.
 99 For instance, the ICN Mergers Working Group has identifi ed four categories of unneces-
sary costs that it urges countries to reduce. These include costs associated with (1) imprecise or 
subjective notifi cation thresholds; (2) notifi cations without an appreciable nexus with the review-
ing jurisdiction; (3) unduly onerous fi ling requirements; and (4) unreasonable delays in the review 
process. ICN Report, supra note 82, at 9–18. See also OECD Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee and International Chamber of Commerce, Recommended Framework for Best 
Practices in International Merger Control Procedures §§ 2.1.2.2–2.1.2.5 (4 October 2001), available 
at www.biac.org/statements/comp/BIAC- ICCMergerPaper.pdf; Merger Streamlining Group, Best 
Practices for the Review of International Mergers 27 (November 2002), available at www.mcmillan-
binch.com/mergerstreamlininggroup.html (hereinafter ‘MSG Report’); ICPAC Report, supra note 
5, at 91–92; American Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Report on Multijurisdictional Merger 
Review Issues 8–11 (17 May 1999), available at www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/antitrust/icpac- mr.doc.
100 The ICN Working Group proposes a set of Recommended Practices to reduce  unnecessary 
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costs – c osts that can be avoided while retaining the current system of multijurisdictional 
merger review.
2 Possibility of confl icting decisions
As discussed above, antitrust laws and enforcement practices diff er across the jurisdic-
tions. At worst, this can lead to inconsistent decisions among antitrust authorities. The 
most prominent enforcement confl ict erupted when the European Commission enjoined 
the proposed merger between two American companies, General Electric and Honeywell, 
in June 2001,101 despite the transaction’s earlier approval in the United States.102 Had it 
not failed, the transaction would have been the largest industrial merger in history.103
The reasons for the transat lantic divergence in the GE/Honeywell case have been exten-
sively debated in the literature.104 Most notably, the US and th e EU authorities diff ered 
on two issues: the competitive eff ects of ‘mixed bundling’ and the existence of vertical 
foreclosure. ‘Mixed bundling’ refers to a practice of off ering goods both separately and 
in a bundle. The European Commission was concerned about the merged entity’s ability 
costs. The ICN urges antitrust agencies to adopt clear notifi cation thresholds and to off er pre- 
notifi cation guidance to parties. These measures would mitigate uncertainties involved in ascer-
taining if a notifi cation is required in a given jurisdiction. The ICN further suggests that states 
should only assert jurisdiction over mergers that have ‘appreciable competitive eff ects within their 
territory’ based on sales the merging parties generate or assets they possess within that jurisdic-
tion. This would eliminate unnecessary fi lings to jurisdictions where the eff ects of a transaction are 
trivial. To alleviate the burden of notifi cations, the ICN proposes methods to limit the amount of 
information agencies require, at least at the initial stage. Finally, the Group proposes allowing for 
early notifi cation of mergers and imposing strict time limits within which agencies must complete 
their reviews. ICN Report, supra note 82, at 18–22; ICPAC Report, supra note 5, ch. III; see gener-
ally MSG Report, supra note 99. See generally International Competition Network, Recommended 
Practices for Merger Notifi cation Procedures (2002), available at www.internationalcompetition
network.org/media/archive0611/mnprecpractices.pdf.
101 GE/Honeywell Commission Decision, supra note 1.
102 See Press Release, US Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger 
Between General Electric and Honeywell, 2 May 2001, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2001/8140.htm. For the cases that followed in the European Union, see GE/
Honeywell Commission Decision, supra note 1; Case T- 209/01, Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Comm’n, 
Case T- 210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm’n, [2006] O.J. C48/26.
103 Fox, supra note 60, at 331, 332, 337 (reporting that the merger deal involved exchange of 
GE stock worth just under US$45 billion, which would have made the merger the largest ever).
104 See id. at 352, 355 (suggesting that the EU had not been accustomed to employing eco-
nomic analysis of consumer welfare benefi ts in their relatively new merger law); Bradford, supra 
note 47, at 397, 406–7 (arguing against the theory that the EU was simply being protectionist); 
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of 
Justice, Address before the George Mason University Symposium, 9 November 2001, available 
at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9536.htm (suggesting that the reasons for the divergence in 
the GE/Honeywell case might come from the number of economists on staff  at the US Department 
of Justice as opposed to the Commission staff , the greater availability of judicial review in the 
United States, and the possibility that the EU has a fundamentally diff erent stance toward 
the reliability of government intervention); Donna Patterson and Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic 
Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, Antitrust 18, 25 (Fall 2001) (concluding that 
the GE/Honeywell disagreement occurred because there are fundamental diff erences between the 
United States and the EU on whether mergers that lead to lower prices are procompetitive or 
anticompetitive).
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to off er complementary products (GE engines and Honeywell avionics) as a bundle. 
According to the Commission, the merged entity’s extensive product range and unparal-
leled access to capital would enable it to lower the price of the bundle until all the competi-
tors were forced to exit the market.105 The US antitrust authorities criticized the mixed 
bundling theory, suggesting that it may penalize fi rms for effi  cient conduct that will result 
in lower prices. The other analytical diff erence – the EU’s concern for vertical foreclosure 
– stemmed from the fact that Honeywell, as a leading supplier of engine starters, could 
disrupt the supply of these essential inputs to GE’s rivals, reinforcing GE’s dominance 
in the engine market.106 Again, the US authorities disagreed, asserting that the EU had 
underestimated the adaptive responses of other market participants.107
The GE/Honeywell transaction was not the fi rst confl ict between antitrust enforcers. 
In 1991, the European Commission prohibited the European- owned ATR from acquir-
ing the Canadian- based de Havilland, even though the Canadian antitrust authorities 
had already approved the same transaction.108 The Commission held that the merger 
would have given the new entity excessive market power in Europe.109 Canadian antitrust 
authorities, on the other hand, supported the transaction, arguing that de Havilland was 
a ‘failing fi rm’ that would have gone out of business unless saved by an acquisition.110 
An enforcement confl ict nearly occurred in another aircraft- industry merger involving 
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, which the Commission threatened to enjoin despite 
the clearance decision in the United States.111 The two jurisdictions were able to avoid 
confl ict eventually, but only after extensive political pressure from the United States; the 
Commission ultimately backed down and agreed to clear a merger, subject to signifi cant 
commitments.
The confl icts associated with decentralized antitrust regimes are not limited to mergers. 
Inconsistent remedies may result each time that corporations are targets of antitrust 
investigation in several jurisdictions simultaneously. For example, American, European, 
and Korean authorities imposed diff erent remedies in their investigation of Microsoft’s 
alleged abusive practices. The European Commission, for instance, concluded that 
105 The Commission relied on the theory of ‘portfolio eff ects’, referring to the advantage the 
merged entity would have had because of its broad product portfolio and superior access to capital 
through GE’s subsidiary GE capital.
106 Fox, supra note 60, at 339–40.
107 Timothy Muris, Chairman of Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Enforcement in a World of 
Multiple Arbiters, Remarks before the Brookings Institution Roundtable on Trade and Investment 
Policy, 21 December 2001, available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/brookings.pdf. 
108 Commission Decision of 2 October 1991, Aerospatiale- Alenia/de Havilland, Case No. 
IV/M.053, [1991] O.J. L334/42 (12 May 1991).
109 See id. paras 32–3, 36–42; Robert Howse and M.J. Trebilcock, The Regulation of 
International Trade 604 (3d ed. 2005).
110 Ioannis Kokkoris, Failing Firm Defence in the European Union: A Panacea for Mergers?, 
2006 Eur. Compet. L. Rev. 494, 497–8 (2006).
111 See Commission Decision of 30 July 1997, Boeing/McDonnell- Douglas, Case No. IV/M.877, 
[1997] O.J. L336/16 (8 December, 1997); see generally Thomas L. Boeder, The Boeing- McDonnell 
Douglas Merger, in Antitrust Goes Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation? 
139 (Simon J. Evenett, Alexander Lehmann, and Benn Steil eds., 2000); William E. Kovacic, 
Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing- McDonnell Douglas Merger and International Competition 
Policy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 805, 817–63 (2000–2001).
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Microsoft had anticompetitively tied its Windows operating system to the Windows 
Media Player, and required Microsoft to off er an unbundled version of its products for 
European customers.112 The Korean authorities’ approach was similar to the Europeans’: 
they also required Microsoft to unbundle its products.113 In contrast, the US authorities 
did not require a comparable remedy in their settlement decree.114
Confl icting enforcement dec isions have several economic and political consequences. 
William Kolasky, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, identi-
fi ed three key implications from the enforcement confl ict in the GE/Honeywell case. First, 
when one jurisdiction blocks a merger that other jurisdictions fi nd procompetitive, the 
former jurisdiction denies consumers around the world the benefi ts the merger might 
have delivered. Second, inconsistent substantive standards applied by the United States 
and the EU increase transaction costs associated with the multijurisdictional merger 
review process, possibly deterring effi  ciency- enhancing mergers. Third, the divergence 
akin to the one witnessed in the GE/Honeywell case undermines the political consensus 
supporting strong antitrust enforcement.115
Enforcement confl icts also increase tensions among antitrust regulators. The McDonnell 
Douglas controversy escalated into a political battle where the US administration consid-
ered a range of actions against the Europeans in response to the European Commission’s 
threat to enjoin the merger, including the possibility of limiting transatlantic fl ights, 
imposing retaliatory tariff s on European aircrafts, and challenging the Commission’s 
decision before the WTO.116 The criticism was no less muted after the negative GE/
Honeywell decision. The US Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neil, described the deci-
sion as being ‘off  the wall’, adding that the Commission was ‘the closest thing you can 
fi nd to an autocratic organization that can successfully impose their will on things that 
one would think are outside their scope of attention’.117 Similarly, when the European 
112 See Christian Ahlborn and David Evans, The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications 
Towards Dominant Firms in Europe, 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, § II.A (2009); Harry First, Strong 
Spine, Weak Underbelly: The CFI Microsoft Decision (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper 
No. 08- 17, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract51020850.
113 Korea Fair Trade Commission, The Findings of the Microsoft Case (7 December 2005), at 
1, available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/micorsoft_case.pdf [sic]; Youngjin Jung, Abuse of Market 
Dominance in Korea: Some Refl ections on the KFTC’s Microsoft Decision, 36 Legal Issues of Econ. 
Integration 57, 59 (2009).
114 Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust 
and the Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 189, 190 n.8 (2009); 
Harry First, Netscape is Dead: Remedy Lessons from the Microsoft Litigation, at 9–12 (New York 
University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 166, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/
nyu_lewp/166/. A similar confl ict between regimes occurred when the the European Union and the 
United States reviewed British Airways’ and Virgin Airlines’ loyalty discounts. The United States 
concluded that the conduct was permissible under its law, but the EU condemned the conduct as 
contrary to its law. See Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 
2001); Case T- 219/99, British Airways PLC v. Comm’n, [2003] E.C.R. II- 5917.
115 Kolasky, supra note 104. 
116 Steven Pearlstein and Anne Swardson, U.S. Gets Tough to Ensure Boeing, McDonnell 
Douglas Merger; Retaliation Plan in Works as Europe Threatens, Washington Post, 17 July 1997, 
at C01.
117 Tom Brown, Update 2: U.S. Treasury Chief Slaps at Europe Over GE Deal, Reuters, 27 
June 2001.
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Court of First Instance handed down its judgment in the Microsoft case, Tom Barnett, 
the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the time, criticized the judgment vocally, 
accusing the Europeans of ‘chilling innovation and discouraging competition’.118
The furor surrounding these high- profi le merger controversies shadows the fact that 
the instances of actual confl ict are extremely rare. Despite the common fear of incon-
sistent merger decisions, the GE/Honeywell and the De Havilland/ATR cases remain 
rare examples of mergers which resulted in diff erent antitrust jurisdictions adopting 
contradictory decisions. This is remarkable given how frequently mergers are reviewed 
by multiple antitrust agencies applying diff erent substantive standards and relying on 
dissimilar analytical processes.119 One might also argue that corporations can avoid 
jurisdictional confl icts by conforming their conduct to the most stringent jurisdiction.120 
This, however, leads to ano ther problem, where the most stringent antitrust jurisdiction 
has the ability to set the standards of competitive conduct in global markets, as will be 
discussed in section IIC.121
B Emergence of Antitrust Protectionism
Some commentators believe that states employ antitrust laws to further protectionist 
goals.122 As traditional trade barrie rs have fallen following multiple rounds of trade 
118 See Thomas O. Bartnett, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Dep’t of 
Justice, Statement on European Microsoft Decision (17 September 2007), available at www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.htm..
119 However, it is conceivable that the mere possibility of a negative decision by a certain author-
ity leads to costs in terms of ineffi  ciencies embedded in structuring the merger. The merging parties 
might, for instance, carve out certain assets of a transaction in order to avoid fi ling in a certain juris-
diction. Similarly, they may do this to pre- empt an in- depth investigation (a ‘second request’ equiva-
lent in another jurisdiction) or to avoid having to agree to extensive commitments as a condition for 
clearance. It is diffi  cult, if at all possible, to evaluate the costs of ineffi  ciencies embedded in this type 
of precautionary action. Also, the issue is not limited to mergers. See Dave Heiner, Working to Fulfi ll 
Our Legal Obligations in Europe for Windows 7 (11 June 2009), available at http://microsoftonthe-
issues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/06/11/working- to- fulfi ll- our- legal- obligations- in- europe- 
for- windows- 7.aspx (discussing Microsoft’s proposal to off er Windows 7 without Internet Explorer 
in the European Union); Brad Smith, Microsoft Proposal to European Commission (24 July 2009), 
available at www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/jul09/07- 24statement.mspx (proposing that 
Microsoft could release a version of Windows 7 with full browser capability, but giving the user 
the option of selecting which browser to install). Microsoft had proposed this design for Windows 
7 to preempt a regulatory setback, not to provide consumers the features they demand. Similarly, 
companies may refrain from off ering their products at the lowest competitive price, fearing investi-
gations by jurisdictions with low evidentiary  standards for predation.
120 Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1100.
121 Id. See discussion infra.
122 See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and 
Economics in Europe and in the United States, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 1555, 1632 (2008) (surmising that 
protectionism is a problem both in the United States and in the European Union, but that the size 
of the market may exacerbate the problem in the European context); Fox, supra note 60, at 336 
(raising the more moderate hypothesis that agencies do not follow an explicitly acknowledged 
policy of protectionism, but may still have professional inclinations to cooperate with politicians’ 
nationalistic agendas); Guzman, supra note 7, at 100–101; Kerber, supra note 27, at 44; Paul B. 
Stephan, Against International Cooperation, in Competition Laws in Conflict, supra note 7, at 75.
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negotiations, states are expected to look for alternative ways to protect their domestic 
markets.123 Domestic fi rms seeking protection may increasingly turn to antitrust authori-
ties, urging them to block the entry of foreign rivals on antitrust grounds, or to tolerate 
domestic fi rms’ monopolistic practices in an eff ort to bolster their international com-
petitiveness.124 If successful, these protectionist pressures can convert antitrust laws into 
instruments of industrial policy, severely undermining the gains of trade liberalization.
Antitrust protectionism can take several forms: states may engage in systematic 
under- or overenforcement of antitrust laws depending on their terms of trade (‘trade- 
fl ow bias’). States may also exempt domestic fi rms from antitrust scrutiny altogether 
(‘statutory bias’). Similarly, antitrust agencies may engage in selective enforcement 
practices, disproportionately targeting foreign fi rms at the expense of domestic fi rms 
in their investigations (‘enforcement bias’). Yet the key assumption behind all forms of 
alleged antitrust protectionism is the same: each antitrust jurisdiction internalizes the 
costs and the benefi ts incurred by its domestic producers and consumers, while exter-
nalizing the costs and the benefi ts sustained by producers and consumers in another 
jurisdiction.
1 Trade- fl ow bias in antitrust laws
Andrew Guzman has developed a theory on how trade fl ows across countries can impact 
the type of antitrust laws a country adopts (‘trade- fl ow bias’).125 Consistent with rational 
ch oice theory, Guzman assumes that states ‘externalize the costs and internalize the 
benefi ts of the exercise of market power across borders’ to maximize their national wel-
fare.126 This behavior, according to Guzman, leads states to choose the appropriate level 
of antitrust regulation based on their trading status as a net- importer or a net- exporter. 
A net- importer country employs stricter- than- optimal antitrust standards (overregula-
tion), since it does not internalize costs of overenforcement, which are primarily borne 
by foreign producers.127 Conversely, a net- exporter country enacts laxer- than- optimal 
antitrust laws (underregulation), since the costs of the lax enforcement fall on foreign 
consumers. Both over- and underregulation are instances of suboptimal antitrust 
enforcement that reduces welfare globally.
Guzman does not draw on game theoretic insights when developing his theory. 
Implicitly, however, he seems to assume that the strategic setting underlying interna-
tional antitrust cooperation resembles a prisoner’s dilemma (PD). Guzman argues that 
123 See Edward D. Mansfi eld and Marc L. Busch, The Political Economy of Nontariff  Barriers: 
A Cross- National Analysis, in International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global 
Power and Wealth 353 (Jeff rey A. Frieden and David A. Lake eds, Routledge, 4th ed. 2000); 
Henrik Horn and James Levinsohn, Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization 1 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6077, 1997), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id5226484.
124 See Kerber, supra note 27, at 45–6.
125 Guzman, supra note 7, at 101; Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1142, 1154–5 (2001).
126 Id.
127 ‘Optimal’ antitrust laws would be globally effi  cient, as no state would engage in over- or 
underenforcement, but would choose the same antitrust laws as they would have absent trade fl ows. 
Id. at 108–9.
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 individual antitrust enforcers’ uncoordinated action leads to a Pareto- suboptimal solu-
tion as each state seeks to increase its national welfare at the expense of other states. 
Individual states always maximize their own welfare by choosing a noncooperative 
strategy (over- or underregulation), even though choosing to enforce optimal antitrust 
laws (i.e., refraining from over- or underregulation) would maximize states’ collective 
welfare.128 Guzman also assumes that any agreement to overcome these suboptimal 
incentives would be diffi  cult to sustain as the states would have the incentive to defect 
from their commitments.129 These assumptions are consistent with a PD- type game.130 In 
a PD situation, each state has the incentive to defect from the agreement, as it can increase 
its payoff  by taking advantage of the other party’s cooperation while refusing to cooper-
ate itself. Thus, the primary impediment for cooperation is the constant fear of the other 
player’s defection from the agreement.131
In a PD situation, a net- exporter can maximize its welfare by underregulating whereas 
a net- importer can maximize its welfare by overregulating.132 State A, for instance, could 
obtain the highest individual payoff  by choosing to overregulate (if a net- importer) or 
underregulate (if a net- exporter), if state B chose optimal antitrust laws. State B, however, 
will not choose optimal antitrust laws. It knows that if it chooses optimal antitrust laws 
and state A fails to reciprocate with the same strategy, it receives the lowest possible 
payoff .133 Seeking to maximize their individual payoff s and fearing each other’s  defection, 
128 Id. at 101 (‘each state pursues its own interests without regard for the interests of other 
states’); id. at 108–9 (‘The resulting policies are domestically optimal but are suboptimal from a 
global perspective’); id. at 110 (‘Because cooperative policy is globally optimal, it must be the case 
that there are suffi  cient gains for a Pareto improving agreement to be reached’).
129 Guzman, supra note 125, at 1158 (‘The WTO has additional advantages that make it a 
desirable forum for the negotiation of a competition policy agreement. Most obvious among 
these advantages is the presence of a dispute settlement system. Dispute resolution is of great 
importance because if a deal is reached, some of the parties to the agreement will have consented 
to the system of international antitrust only because they were off ered other benefi ts. In the 
absence of procedures to compel such compliance, these countries have little incentive to honor 
their commitments’).
130 Similar claims are made by Wolfgang Kerber and Oliver Budzinski, who have explic-
itly likened countries’ processes for choosing discriminatory competition policy to a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation. See Kerber and Budzinski, supra note 27, at 44–5. Unlike Guzman, who fi nds 
that ‘optimal strategic antitrust policy’ can be rigid or lenient depending on a country’s terms- of- 
trade, Kerber and Budzinski only describe lenient forms of strategic behavior (i.e., the lax antitrust 
enforcement that comes from a ‘deliberate toleration of market power’). Such a characterization 
of country strategy ignores the possibility that strategic antitrust policy can also lead to exces-
sive antitrust enforcement vis- à- vis foreign competitors. See also Oliver Budzinski, Toward an 
International Governance of Transborder Mergers? Competing Networks and Institutions Between 
Centralism and Decentralism, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. and Pol. 1, 6–8 (2004) (explaining ways in 
which a  noncoordinated merger control regime presents a prisoner’s dilemma situation). 
131 Many international trade issues, for instance, can best be modeled as a PD. See James D. 
Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists 262–3 (Princeton, 1994) (applying the pris-
oner’s dilemma analysis to explain why enforcement of long- term relations, generally, is diffi  cult 
because of incentives to defect from the cooperative enterprise, then suggesting that ‘[t]he regula-
tion of international trade is one such problem’).
132 In comparison, according to Kerber and Budzinski, the dominant strategy for each state 
would be to lower their antitrust standards. See Kerber and Budzinsk; supra note 27, at 41–3.
133 See id. at 44–5.
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both states adopt suboptimal antitrust laws.134 Consequently, both states are worse off  
than they would have been if they both adopted optimal antitrust laws.
Other authors have questioned that trade fl ows could lead to biased antitrust enforce-
ment. Einer Elhauge and Damien Gerardin note that the eff ects doctrine compromises 
states’ ability to engage in systematic underenforcement or overenforcement.135 If a 
net- exporting country were to enact overly lax antitrust laws, its producers would still 
be subject to the antitrust laws of the importing jurisdiction, assuming their activities 
have an eff ect on that market.136 The prospect of a concurrent jurisdiction by import-
ing jurisdictions renders net- exporting countries’ underenforcement irrelevant, steering 
them towards optimal regulation.137 Elhauge and Geradin point out that the importing 
jurisdiction also has optimal incentives to regulate as long as it embraces the consumer 
welfare standard.138
Michael Trebilcock and Edward Iacobucci question whether trade defi cits or surpluses 
would ever determine countries’ preferred level of antitrust regulation, given that trade 
imbalances usually constitute only a small percentage of any nation’s GDP.139 John 
McGinnis notes that tr ade fl ows have a tendency to fl uctuate, and doubts that countries 
amend their antitrust laws in response to their changing trade balances.140 McGinnis 
further argues tha t trade- fl ow bias would be infeasible to apply in practice, consider-
ing that it is often diffi  cult to categorize a multinational corporation as ‘domestic’ or 
‘foreign’. Hence, exercising bias against a ‘foreign’ corporation may have the unintended 
eff ect of harming the corporation’s many domestic shareholders and employees.141 Anu 
Bradford points out that biased policies may have similar unintended consequences 
on domestic industries that rely on intermediate goods, since such goods comprise 
approximately 50% of the total imports in developed countries.142 Thus, if a country is 
a net- importer, predisposed to adopt overly strict antitrust laws, those strict antitrust 
laws would not only target the foreign producers attempting to penetrate the market but 
also domestic fi rms that depend on imported goods as inputs or raw materials.143 This 
134 Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335, 358–9 (1989).
135 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1012–14.
136 This assumes that the foreign antitrust agencies have adequate enforcement capacity, 
including access to evidence, which is not always the case. 
137 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1012–14. 
138 Elhauge and Geradin assume that consumer welfare is the optimal standard for antitrust 
enforcement rather than total welfare. The US and EU antitrust laws both embrace a consumer 
welfare standard. According to Elhauge and Geradin, the case for a consumer welfare standard is 
even stronger internationally than domestically, because in the international situation it is less likely 
that increases in producer welfare will benefi t consumers as employees, shareholders, or taxpayers. 
Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1103.
139 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 168–9. 
140 John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, in 
Competition Laws in Conflict, supra note 7, at 136.
141 Id. at 134.
142 Bradford, supra note 47, at 390–91. On trade in intermediate goods, see Jörn Kleinert, 
Growing Trade in Intermediate Goods: Outsourcing, Global Sourcing, or Increasing Importance of 
MNE Networks?, 11 Rev. Int’l Econ. 464 (2003).
143 See id. at 464–5.
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criticism, if accepted, suggests that trade fl ows have, at best, only a marginal eff ect on 
countries’ level of  antitrust regulation.
2 Export cartels as examples of antitrust protectionism
Antitrust protectionism can also manifest itself in the types of exemptions given to 
 domestic companies. For example, scholars have frequently cited exemptions for export 
cartels in domestic antitrust laws as an example of biased antitrust enforcement that 
favors domestic fi rms.144 An export cartel refers to an agreement between two or more 
fi rms to charge a specifi ed export price or to divide export markets among them.145 The 
diff erence between an e xport cartel and a normal cartel is that an export cartel restricts 
its collusive behavior to goods or services that are exported to foreign markets. Export 
cartels enhance the welfare of domestic fi rms, which can extract supracompetitive 
profi ts at the expense of foreign consumers. The export cartel’s home state does not 
have the incentive to pursue the cartel’s anticompetitive activity given that the entire 
 anticompetitive harm falls outside of its jurisdiction.146
To illustrate how export cartels can serve states’ protectionist interests, assume that 
state A is the exporting jurisdiction, and state B is the importing jurisdiction. Critics 
of export cartel exemptions fear that state A exempts export cartels because it fails to 
consider the cartels’ anticompetitive eff ects on state B’s consumers. Knowing this, state 
B likewise chooses to exempt export cartels from its antitrust laws, given that the anti-
competitive harm falls on state A’s consumers. As a result, both state A and state B fail 
to pursue export cartels, causing harm to both state A and state B consumers. This yields 
a suboptimal payoff  for both states.
It is, however, unclear that the above description of the strategic situation is  accurate. 
144 See Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 152. See also Guzman, supra note 7, at 
100 (referring to export cartels as the ‘most obvious example’ of states’ biased application of their 
antitrust laws); Florian Becker, The Case of Export Cartel Exemptions: Between Competition and 
Protectionism, 3 J. Compet. L. and Econ. 97, 101–8 (2007).
145 See discussion on the prevalence of export cartels in Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. 
Suslow, The Changing International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
785, 793, 796 (2005).
146 In contrast, some have defended the practice of exempting export cartels. The proponents 
of export cartel exemptions argue that they are predominantly formed to create export opportuni-
ties for small- and medium- sized companies who would not have the resources to engage in export 
activity alone. Export cartels are hence argued to generate new trading opportunities and enhance 
(instead of diminish) competition on markets where exporters would otherwise not compete at all. 
The United States, for example, defended the WPA and ETCA in the WTO in 2003 by arguing that 
these exemptions ‘were conceived as mechanisms for domestic entities that lacked the resources to 
engage in eff ective export activity acting individually’. See WTO Fed. Rep., WT/WGTCP/M/21, 
at 15 (26 May 2003). See also Spencer Weber Waller, The Failure of the Export Trading Company 
Program, 17 N.C. J. Int’l L. and Com. Reg. 239, 250 (1992) (‘[today] the ETC program has been 
used almost exclusively by small export intermediaries and by trade associations focusing on a 
small group of products, industries and markets’); id. at 251 (‘the history of Webb- Pomerene Act 
suggests that few export associations will have suffi  cient global market power to exploit foreign 
markets’). See also Aditya Bhattacharjea, Export Cartels: A Developing Country Perspective 32 
(Centre for Dev. Econ. Working Paper No. 120, 2004) (arguing that neither a per se prohibition 
nor a presumption of effi  ciencies constitutes an optimal policy response to export cartels exporting 
to developing countries).
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One may argue that export cartel exemptions do not pose a serious international enforce-
ment problem. Even when state A exempts the export cartel from its antitrust laws, state 
B can pursue the export cartel under its domestic antitrust laws as long as the cartel 
adversely aff ects competition in state B’s domestic market.147 One can even argue that the 
decision by state A not to prosecute the cartel represents optimal allocation of jurisdic-
tion: state B is in a better position to evaluate the eff ects of the cartel on its own market. Of 
course, this argument assumes that state B has the resources to impose eff ective remedies 
on the cartel. Eff ective prosecution by state B may therefore require assistance from state 
A, in particular if the evidence is located in the jurisdiction of the latter.148
3 Antitrust protectionism embedded in biased enforcement
Antitrust laws rarely plainly favor local fi rms at the expense of their foreign counterparts. 
But even facially neutral antitrust laws can lead to discrimination if those unbiased laws 
are enforced selectively. Antitrust agencies are often vested with substantial discretion. 
Organized domestic interest groups could exploit that discretion by seeking protection 
from antitrust enforcement or by urging the domestic authorities to take on cases against 
their foreign competitors. This could lead to deliberate underenforcement of the anti-
competitive conduct of domestic corporations, or to deliberate overenforcement of the 
anticompetitive conduct of foreign corporations.149
Biased enforcement diff ers from the trade- fl ow bias discussed above in that state A 
and state B would not generally underenforce or overenforce based on their status as 
a net- exporter or net- importer. Instead, both states would have optimal antitrust laws 
but would engage in selective enforcement of those laws case- by- case, depending on the 
nationality of the corporation that they are investigating. For instance, state A might 
approve an anticompetitive merger between two state A fi rms to build a national cham-
pion that can better compete internationally, while prohibiting a merger between two 
state B companies in order to protect their rival in state A who opposes the merger.
It seems plausible that antitrust enforcers deliberately overlook the anticompeti-
tive conduct of domestic corporations in individual instances while disproportionately 
147 This argument, however, assumes that the importing country is vested with adequate 
enforcement capacity and can hence be problematic if the prosecution of the export cartel requires 
evidence that is located in the exporting jurisdiction or if the importing jurisdiction cannot impose 
eff ective remedies. 
148 Cf. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256–7, 266 (2004) (noting 
that US law will permit agencies to lend discovery assistance to ‘any interested person’, even if that 
person is involved in a foreign proceeding).
149 Guzman, supra note 7, at 100. Guzman expects this type of ‘favoritism toward locals’ to 
take place at the administrative level, ‘either because the regulators themselves view local fi rms 
more favorably or because political leaders bring pressure to bear on regulators and encourage 
them to pursue foreign fi rms rather than national champions’. See also McGinnis, supra note 140, 
at 128–9, 134 (explaining that regulators have an interest in maintaining an interventionist policy 
because it enables them to extract greater rents and acknowledging that regulators could discrimi-
nate between local and foreign fi rms); Kerber, supra note 27, at 41–4. See also an analysis of how 
domestic antitrust enforcement can become susceptible to bias in Fred S. McChesney, Debate: 
Public Choice: Do Politics Corrupt Antitrust Enforcement? Economics versus Politics in Antitrust, 
23 Harv. J.L. and Pub. Pol’y 133 (1999). 
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 targeting foreign corporations.150 Suspicions were reinforced when the EC Commission 
threatened to block the merger between the two US- based companies, Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas, after the merger had been cleared in the United States.151 Both 
the United States and the EU accused one another of engaging in industrial policy: the 
Europeans perceived the US clearance of the merger as an eff ort to create a US- based 
global monopolist in the large civil jet aircraft market, whereas the Americans accused 
the EU of opposing the merger to protect Boeing’s main European rival, Airbus, from 
competition.152 Distrust over antitrust protectionism escalated further in 2001, when the 
EU moved on to prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger.153
Despite the perception of protectionism, a deeper inquiry into the EU antitrust 
authorities’ merger decisions does not reveal any systematic bias against US corpora-
tions. In fact, while 25% of the merger notifi cations the EU Commission received in 
1995–2005 involved at least one US- based company, only 12% of the prohibited mergers 
involved a US corporation.154 Similarly, only 17% of the mergers withdrawn after the 
notifi cation involved a US corporation, 26% of the Commission’s initiated phase II 
investigations (‘second request’) involved a US corporation, and 27% of the conditional 
clearances were granted in cases that involved a US company. These numbers suggest 
that any enforcement bias would be limited to a small number of individual cases, or that 
enforcement bias may not even exist. There are several reasons for this. For instance, the 
threat of judicial review may suffi  ciently deter antitrust agencies from engaging in blatant 
150 The claim that antitrust agencies engage in selective enforcement is consistent with well- 
developed public choice theories of agency capture. These theories explain how government 
agencies respond to the demands of organized interest groups. Tanya Heikkila, The Contribution 
of Public Choice Analysis to Decision Making Theories, in Handbook of Decision Making 23–4 
(Göktuğ Morçöl ed., CRC 2007) (discussing ‘bureaucratic pathologies’ where interest groups 
spend resources on lobbying rather than productive activity and bureaucrats allocate resources 
to strengthen their political base rather than to best fulfi ll their mission); James M. Buchanan 
and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy 287 (Michigan, 1962) (using economic analysis to explain that interest groups become 
entrenched because the political process can give unequal advantages, and these unequal advan-
tages then further strengthen interest groups and incentivize them to pursue further preferential 
treatment).
151 See Commission Decision of 30 July 1997, Boeing/McDonnell- Douglas, Case No. IV/M.877, 
[1997] O.J. L336/16 (8 December 1997); Boeing Co., et al., Joint Statement Closing Investigation of 
the Proposed Merger, FTC File No. 971- 0051 (1 July 1997), reported in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 
para. 24, 295.
152 Kerber, supra note 27, at 42. 
153 See Fox, supra note 60, at 332 (citing Matt Murray, Phillip Shishkin, Bob Davis, and 
Anita Raghavan, Oceans Apart: As Honeywell Deal Goes Awry for GE, Fallout May be Global – 
The U.S. Giant’s Troubles in Europe Could Chill Mergers of Multinationals – Raining on Welch’s 
Parade, Wall St. J., 15 June 2001, at A1 (quoting Sen. Ernest Hollings of the Senate Commerce 
Committee) (‘EU disapproval gives credence to those who suspect that the EU is using its merger 
review process as a tool to protect and promote European industry at the expense of its US com-
petitors’). Senator Hollings further accused the EU of ‘an apparent double standard by swiftly 
approving mergers involving European companies and holding up those of US groups’.
154 Commission Decision of 28 June 2000, MCIWorldCom/Sprint, Case No. COMP/M.1741, 
[2000] O.J. L300/1; GE/Honeywell Commission Decision, supra note 1. Note that the MCIWorld-
Com/Sprint merger was also challenged in the United States. In contrast, the General Electric/
Honeywell merger was approved subject to limited undertakings in the United States. 
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 parochialism. Agencies must also give reasons for their decisions, and will therefore fi nd 
it diffi  cult to depart manifestly from an established legal framework.155
Another question is whether some less established antitrust regimes with fewer institu-
tional safeguards are more susceptible to antitrust protectionism. China’s fi rst enforce-
ment decisions under its newly adopted Antimonopoly Law156 off er some indication 
that antitrust review could be used as a vehicle for protectionism.157 China’s decision to 
prohibit Coca- Cola’s proposed acquisition of the Chinese juice company Huiyuan,158 for 
instance, raised suspicions on the motivations behind China’s antitrust policy. While it is 
too soon to draw drastic conclusions based on China’s limited enforcement record, the 
possibility of China becoming a major antitrust force that repeatedly applies its antitrust 
laws strategically to block the market entry of foreign companies has reinforced concerns 
of antitrust protectionism.
C Global Overregulation
The fi nal problem relating to decentralized antitrust enforcement is that the strictest 
antitrust jurisdiction always prevails when a real jurisdictional confl ict arises. This leads 
to global overregulation. To illustrate this, assume that both state A and state B choose 
suboptimal antitrust laws: state A underregulates and state B overregulates. State A 
155 McGinnis, supra note 140, at 134–5 (noting that institutional checks and craft interests help 
deter overly discriminatory policies). 
156 See Sundeep Tucker, InBev Ruling Sparks Fears for M&A in China, Financial Times, 30 
November 2008 (noting that the InBev/Anheuser- Busch deal was approved, but with a number of 
unanticipated restrictions that will prevent InBev from acquiring further interests in certain com-
panies in the Chinese beer market); Gordon Fairclough and Carlos Tejada, China’s Coke Decision 
Threatens to Chill Investment, Wall St. J. (Eastern), 19 March 2009, at B9 (describing China’s 
decision to block of the proposed Coca- Cola/Huiyuan merger after widespread nationalistic 
resentment of foreign ownership); Aaron Back and J.R. Wu, China Flexes Global Merger Clout, 
Imposes Conditions on Lucite Deal, Wall St. J., 28 April 2009, at B6 (conditioning approval of 
the Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite merger on a fi ve- year ban that prevents it from acquiring any Chinese 
producer of methylmethacrylate or building factories in China making such products). Cf. Anti- 
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Presidential Order No. 68 (National People’s 
Congress, 2007, 2008), www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009- 02/20/content_1471587.htm (PRC).
157 See Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, and Wentong Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms: 
The Antimonopoly Law and Beyond 28 (Stanford John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 339, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id5978810 (explaining that administrative monopolies could create regional blockage leading to 
protectionism); Salil K. Mehra and Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering 
China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 380, 421–3 (2009) (noting that China still needs to 
clarify how the Antimonopoly Law will balance social welfare concerns while avoiding improper 
protectionism). Cf. Adrian Emch, Abuse of Dominance in China: A Paradigmatic Shift?, 29 Eur. 
Compet. L. Rev. 615, 622 (2008) (explaining that the current scope of the Antimonopoly Law is 
unclear and that art. 7 may exempt ‘industries vital to the national economy and national security’).
158 Andrew Batson, China’s Statement Blocking Coca- Cola Huiyuan Deal, Wall St. J. (China 
Journal Blog), 18 March 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s- 
statement- blocking- coca- cola- huiyuan- deal/. For the original Chinese statement, see Ministry 
of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 商务部就可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司
案反垄断审查做出裁决 (18 March 2009), available at www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/
ai/200903/20090306108388.html. 
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may choose to underregulate for protectionist or nonprotectionist reasons. It may be a 
net- exporter wishing to extract welfare gains at the expense of the importing jurisdiction 
or it may simply not believe in the benefi ts of strong antitrust intervention. In contrast, 
state B may choose to overregulate, similarly for a variety of protectionist and legitimate 
reasons. Assuming that state A (underregulator) and state B (overregulator) investi-
gate the same transaction, state B prevails. This example exposes the key international 
 antitrust paradox: the strictest regime wins.
Imagine that state A is the United States examining the GE/Honeywell transaction 
and state B is the EU examining the same transaction. Suppose fi rst that the transaction 
would have an identical eff ect in both markets but that the antitrust authorities in the 
United States and in the EU diff er in their assessments on whether the merger should 
proceed. The United States favors a permissive antitrust policy and chooses to approve 
the transaction. The EU favors an interventionist policy and chooses to prohibit the 
transaction. The inevitable outcome is that the EU antitrust policy prevails: the GE/
Honeywell transaction is banned, not just in the EU, but around the world.
Now suppose that the GE/Honeywell transaction would have diff erent eff ects in the US 
and the EU markets: the merger would increase consumer welfare in the United States 
and reduce consumer welfare in the EU. Assume further that the expected effi  ciencies 
of the merger in the United States would off set its alleged competitive harm within the 
EU. When evaluating the merger, the EU antitrust authorities would ignore the merger’s 
possible effi  ciencies in the United States, in the same way the US authorities would disre-
gard any alleged anticompetitive harm in the EU. Advancing domestic consumer welfare 
rather than global welfare is consistent with both US and EU antitrust laws. However, 
assuming that the merger’s expected aggregate global effi  ciencies outweighed its expected 
aggregate global anticompetitive harm, the EU’s decision to ban the merger would be 
globally suboptimal.
The GE/Honeywell case illustrates the more general phenomenon that the decentralized 
antitrust enforcement consisting of both under- and overenforcement is likely to lead to 
overregulation globally. It is debatable whether the United States or the EU was pursu-
ing optimal antitrust policy in the GE/Honeywell controversy. But assuming that both 
the United States and the EU are equally likely to err toward under- and overregulation 
across the range of antitrust cases, the net eff ect is global overregulation.159 If the EU 
antitrust decisions overall are more stringent than those of the United States, the United 
States eff ectively relinquishes the antitrust regulation of international business activity 
to the EU. This way, the EU becomes the de facto global antitrust regulator, simply by 
choosing more stringent enforcement policies.160
Damien Geradin illustrates the same problem by off ering a hypothetical example of a 
fi rm A’s decision to integrate a piece of software into its hardware. Firm B, which off ers 
only the software in question, launches a complaint before antitrust authorities in juris-
dictions X, Y, and Z, after having lost sales to fi rm A. Assume that antitrust authorities 
of jurisdictions X and Y note that there is consumer demand for the integrated product, 
and reach a decision that fi rm A’s conduct is procompetitive. Assume further that this 
159 Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49, at 1100–1101.
160 See id. at 1101.
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decision follows a sound economic analysis. The jurisdiction Z, however, decides to forgo 
any eff ects- based analysis and declares that fi rm A’s conduct constitutes anticompetitive 
tying. It orders fi rm A to disintegrate the product and imposes a substantial fi ne. In the 
worst- case scenario, fi rm A would be forced to abandon the sale of its integrated product 
altogether. This might be the case if it is too expensive to design diff erent products for 
diff erent markets (for instance, integrated products for markets X and Y and separate 
products for the market Z).161
The problem of global overregulation could be mitigated if corporations could easily 
escape from the antitrust review of an overly zealous antitrust jurisdiction. This could be 
done, for instance, by carving out assets located in a particular jurisdiction when structur-
ing a merger to avoid notifi cation in that particular jurisdiction. Similarly, a corporation 
might cease to supply customers in a particular jurisdiction or it may change its product 
design or distribution practices in a particular market. For instance, the easiest way out 
for fi rm A in the previous example would have been to abandon business in jurisdiction 
Z. But this is generally an option only when the jurisdiction Z is insignifi cant enough to 
make abandonment commercially viable.162 The merging parties in the GE/Honeywell 
transaction, for instance, could have evaded EU antitrust review only by withdrawing 
from the EU market altogether. But abandoning the world’s largest market was never, 
obviously, a realistic option. As the most aggressive antitrust enforcers are generally the 
jurisdictions with the largest consumer markets (including the EU, Brazil, Korea, and 
maybe increasingly China),163 escaping their jurisdiction is rarely feasible. Accordingly, 
global overregulation remains a signifi cant problem.164
Antitrust diff ers from many other areas of law subject to jurisdictional competition 
in that the strictest regime governs fi rms’ conduct in global markets. This defi es the pre-
vailing theories of regulatory competition. Regulatory competition is often believed to 
lead to either welfare- increasing legal rules and regulations (‘race to the top’) or welfare- 
reducing legal rules and regulations (‘race to the bottom’). The jurisdictional competition 
of corporate charters in the United States is an example of the latter: corporations have 
the choice of law to incorporate in any state. This gives all states an incentive to adopt 
161 Geradin, supra note 114, at 203–4.
162 Id. at 204.
163 Id. at 206.
164 Corporations may exacerbate this problem by forum shopping. Though they cannot engage 
in forum shopping for their own merger approvals (since a lone jurisdiction that blocks the merger 
can block the merger from happening anywhere), they can still shop for forums that will be most 
receptive to their complaints against competitors’ mergers. For example, the European Commission 
has garnered enough of a reputation for aggressive investigation of anticompetitive practices that 
US companies will lodge complaints before the Commission rather than before a domestic agency. 
See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, Google Pledges to Support EU’s Microsoft Case, Guardian, 25 February 
2009, www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/feb/25/microsoft- internet; Miguel Helft, Google Joins 
Europe Case Against Microsoft, N.Y. Times, 24 February 2009 (noting that Google had attempted 
to lodge a complaint with the US Department of Justice in the past, and fi nding it unsurprising that 
Google would join Opera’s complaint against Microsoft in the EU). Cf. European Commission, 
Antitrust: Commission Confi rms Sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of 
Internet Explorer to Windows (17 January 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleas-
esAction.do?reference5MEMO/09/15&format5HTML&aged50&language5EN&guiLanguage
5en.
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business- friendly corporate laws in order to attract corporations and thereby increase 
their tax base. At best, this incentive leads to more effi  cient and innovative rules. At worst, 
however, regulatory competition leads to a detrimental race to the bottom whereby 
jurisdictions compete to lower their regulatory standards, including environmental or 
labor standards, in order to attract businesses that are seeking to reduce their production 
costs.165
For regulatory competition to occur,  fi rms must either be able to choose the laws 
that apply to them or be able to relocate to their chosen jurisdictions. Neither of these 
preconditions are present in antitrust law. The eff ects doctrine prevents corporations 
from choosing an applicable antitrust law through choice of law or relocation. The only 
possible race in antitrust enforcement is therefore the race to be the strictest jurisdiction 
among the states seeking to assert their norms globally, given that all other jurisdictions 
yield to the most aggressive regulator in case of a confl ict.
The ‘strictest regime wins’ phenomenon could have some positive eff ects, however. 
For example, it could correct distortions stemming from suboptimally lenient antitrust 
enforcement. Some jurisdictions do not have the capacity to prosecute multinational 
companies who extract supracompetitive profi ts within their borders. Such countries 
rely on other aggressive jurisdictions with the resources to pursue anticompetitive cross- 
border conduct of multinational enterprises, hoping to free- ride on their investigations. 
For instance, suppose that an international cartel has anticompetitive eff ects in the 
United States, the EU, and several developing countries. The developing countries will 
look to the United States and the EU to prosecute and sanction the cartel. But if none 
of the anticompetitive eff ects are felt in jurisdictions that have enforcement capacity, a 
serious risk of underenforcement remains. The United States and the EU will not expend 
resources in pursuing a cartel that has trivial or no eff ects in their domestic jurisdictions. 
Some may therefore argue that global overregulation is desirable in that it compensates 
for the underenforcement of antitrust laws by weaker antitrust jurisdictions. However, 
many others advocate for more direct ways to mitigate the problem of underenforce-
ment, such as off ering technical assistance to help weak antitrust jurisdictions pursue 
their investigations.
III TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST REGIME?
The above problems of decentralized antitrust enforcement have led many states and 
numerous scholars to advance proposals to enhance international antitrust conver-
gence. These proposals range from complete substantive harmonization of antitrust 
laws to various decentralized forms of cooperation. Some envision the establishment of 
a stand- alone international antitrust organization166 that will enforce the harmonized 
165 See Fox, supra note 7, at 1790–91; Oliver Budzinski, The Governance of Global 
Competition: Competence Allocation in International Competition Policy 80 (Edward 
Elgar, 2008) (explaining how countries can attract foreign business by either improving domestic 
competition conditions or off ering lax standards).
166 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
665, 675 (1999) (arguing for the creation of a ‘World Competition Forum’ for competition- specifi c 
M2832 - ELHAUGE TEXT.indd   311 26/01/2012   16:25
Einer R. Elhauge - 9781848440807
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/09/2016 02:56:26PM
via NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SHARING or POSTING
312  Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law
anti trust law.167 Others propose incorporating substantive antitrust norms within the 
existing institutional framework, via organizations such as the WTO,168 the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)169 and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).170 Some scholars remain skepti-
cal of sub stantive harmonization but advocate limited WTO negotiations to prevent 
anticompetitive private practices from becoming trade barriers,171 or propose rules 
allocating jurisdictional competence among states.172 Still others remain skeptical of any 
issues). But cf. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Intellectual Property in a Global Context, 13 Sw. J.L. 
and Trade Am. 211, 233 (2007) (suggesting, more fl exibly, that the European Union’s proposal 
for a worldwide competition policy could be implemented in the WTO or as a stand- alone project); 
Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust, A Multi- Tiered Challenge: The Doha Dome, 43 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 911, 925–6 (2003) (hereinafter ‘Doha Dome’) (arguing that a stand- alone world antitrust institu-
tion would be theoretically preferable, but conceding that it would be very diffi  cult to establish).
167 See Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 169 (describing the International Antitrust 
Working Group’s Draft International Antitrust Code and proposal for a mandatory World 
Antitrust Authority, but dismissing it as largely irrelevant to modern preoccupations regarding 
antitrust); Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at n.36 (explaining that neither the EU nor the United 
States has the legitimate authority to enforce competition law on behalf of the world).
168 Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at 929–30; Guzman, supra note 125, at 1158; Robert 
D. Anderson and Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilateral Trading 
System, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 531, 557–60 (2002) (explaining various proposals regarding imple-
menting competition law under the WTO); Frédéric Jenny, Globalization, Competition and Trade 
Policy: Convergence, Divergence and Cooperation, in Competition Policy in the Global Trading 
System: Perspectives from the EU, Japan and the USA 295 (Cliff ord A. Jones and Mitsuo 
Matsushita eds., Kluwer, 2002). See generally Martyn Taylor, International Competition 
Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? (Cambridge, 2006); Marsden, supra note 7.
169 See Tarullo, supra note 80, at 501 (proposing that the OECD be given substantial autonomy 
to evolve antitrust arrangements into more ambitious agreements).
170 Ioannis Lianos, The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust 
Law, 15 Tul. J. Int’l and Comp. L. 415, 455–61 (2006–2007) (explaining that UNCTAD may 
play a role in garnering international support by facilitating antitrust negotiations with developing 
countries).
171 See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 7, at 284 (proposing the development of a ‘trade and com-
petition “guideline” by which WTO Members would undertake to prohibit those arrangements 
that substantially impede access to their market and which are thereby likely to lessen competition 
substantially in the relevant market for the products at issue’); Trebilcock and Iacoburri, supra 
note 42, at 154–7 (proposing a ‘national treatment principle’ which would prohibit countries from 
enforcing domestic competition laws in a way that favors domestic producers over foreign produc-
ers); Fox, supra note 7, at 1806 (proposing a modest extension of WTO obligations for member 
states to prevent market closure, but not demanding a comprehensive antitrust agreement); Fox, 
Doha Dome, supra note 166, at 928–31 (suggesting two possible models for global antitrust gov-
ernance, one based on agreeing on certain basic principles and establishing a protocol for dealing 
with clashes, and another that focuses more on technical assistance); Fox, Competition Law and the 
Millennium Round, supra note 166, at 670–72 (proposing that countries could begin by negotiating 
an agreement ensuring market access with any noncompetition considerations transparently dis-
closed). McGinnis is skeptical of negotiating substantive rules in the WTO but proposes including 
an ‘antidiscrimination antitrust code’ within its institutional framework. Such a code would ensure 
that the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism has jurisdiction to condemn discriminatory anti-
trust laws that impede trading partners’ market access. McGinnis, supra note 140, at 126–7, 136–7.
172 See Budzinski, supra note 165, at 203–6 (describing a system of ‘mandatory lead jurisdic-
tion’ where a supranational authority decides which market has suff ered the most anticompetitive 
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binding international antitrust rules, preferring bilateral cooperation between antitrust 
agencies and endorsing voluntary multilateral convergence through the International 
Competition Network (ICN).173
The history of international antitrus t cooperation reveals that none of the more 
ambitious proposals for an international antitrust regime have been realized in prac-
tice; despite the well- known ineffi  ciencies of decentralized antitrust enforcement, no 
overarching international antitrust regime has been established. Instead, international 
cooperation today consists of bilateral cooperation agreements among key jurisdictions 
and pursuits of voluntary multilateral convergence. This section reviews the current stage 
of antitrust cooperation and discusses why eff orts to write binding international antitrust 
rules have failed.
A Current Status of International Antitrust Cooperation
States have attempted to launch international antitrust negotiations on several occa-
sions.174 In 1948, states negotiated international rules against anticompetitive business 
practices. These rules were incorporated into the Havana Charter, which contemplated 
establishment of an International Trade Organization (ITO).175 The Charter failed to 
gain Congress’ approval, and the world abandoned the ITO.176 However, the need for 
multilateral coordination still remained, and the international community has periodi-
cally tried to revive antitrust negotiations in some other form.
In more recent history, the EU in particular has advocated including antitrust in 
impact in order to assign which country gets exclusive jurisdiction over the case); Wood, supra 
note 43, at 186–7 (advocating an international clearinghouse for mergers, where companies could 
submit the fi ling form of their home jurisdiction to the international clearinghouse, which would 
then submit it forward to other jurisdictions for review and optional follow- up).
173 The United States, for example, has continued to stress that any antitrust cooperation 
should be voluntary, through mechanisms such as the ICN. See Antitrust Division, US Dep’t of 
Justice, Final Report of the Int’l Competition Advisory Comm. to the Att’y Gen. and Assistant Att’y 
Gen. for Antitrust ch. 4 (2000), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/fi nalreport.htm; Kolasky, 
supra note 52. See also Wood, supra note 43, at 185 (taking the stance that any attempt at harmoni-
zation would be premature); Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference 
for Non- Binding Regimes, in Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy (Andrew Guzman 
ed., Oxford University Press, 2011) at 331, 333 (arguing that a binding agreement would only yield 
limited gains and that a nonbinding agreement would be able to capture much of the same gains 
with lower transaction cost); Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of 
International Cooperation, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 173, 215–17 (2005) (endorsing a system of regula-
tory competition for innovation and investment, suggesting that countries will have an incentive to 
adopt the best laws once they feel the pressure of a neighbor’s technological progress).
174 See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 7, ch. 1; see also Nataliya Yacheistova, The International 
Competition Regulation A Short Review of a Long Evolution, 18 World Compet. Law and Econ. 
99, 99–110 (1994). 
175 See Susan A. Aaronson, Trade and the American Dream: A Social History of 
Postwar Trade Policy 43 (Kentucky, 1996); Final Act and Related Documents of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (‘Havana Charter’), April 1948, U.N. Doc. E/807, 
available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf.
176 See Aaronson, supra note 175, at 127–31. See also id. at 4–5, 50–8, 61 (discussing the various 
factors and competing priorities that led to the waning of support for the ITO in the United States).
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the WTO’s negotiation agenda. Following the EU’s request, the WTO established a 
Working Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition in 1996 to study the inter-
face between trade and antitrust policy.177 In the 2001 Doha Ministerial meeting, the 
WTO Member States agreed to launch WTO antitrust negotiations in the near future.178 
However, prospective antitrust negotiations came to halt in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial 
meeting, largely as a result of opposition from developing countries.179 The eff orts to 
revive antitrust negotiations by the WTO General Council in 2004 also failed, and anti-
trust was offi  cially removed from the Doha agenda at that time.180 With that decision, 
any further eff orts to adopt antitrust rules within the WTO were abandoned, at least for 
the time being.
The failure to negotiate a binding international antitrust agreement has prompted 
states to pursue voluntary cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally.181 Several 
states have negotiated bilate ral agreements, which allow their antitrust authorities to 
cooperate, for instance, by exchanging market information, assisting each other in 
evidence gathering, coordinating investigations, and negotiating joint remedies.182 The 
primary challenge for the case- by- case cooperation, however, is the agencies’ inabil-
ity to exchange confi dential business information absent a waiver from the relevant 
corporations. For this reason, enforcement cooperation tends to be more successful 
in merger control investigations (where agencies can incentivize corporations to coop-
erate with the prospect of accelerated merger approval) than in cartel investigations 
(where cooperation could expose corporations to additional sanctions in another 
jurisdiction).183
Bilateral cooperation has been partic ularly successful between the United States and 
177 Budzinski, supra note 165, at 137. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration 
of 18 December 1996 (‘Singapore Ministerial Declaration’), WT/MIN(96)/DEC.
178 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001 (‘Doha 
Ministerial Declaration’), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.
179 See, e.g., Day 5: Conference Ends Without Consensus, available at www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm. On 1 August 2004, the WTO General Council 
decided to offi  cially drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round agenda of negotiations. See World 
Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, para. 
1(g). 
180 See id.
181 See generally Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and 
Limits on the Road Towards International Competition Governance, 8 Comp. and Change 223 
(2004); Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective, 
48 Antitrust Bull. 973 (2003); Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case 
Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 Stan. J. Int’l L. 207 (2003). These cooperation 
arrangements have been extensively described elsewhere in the literature. See generally Bruno 
Zanetti, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level (2002); 
Budzinski, supra note 165.
182 Some states have concluded formal bilateral agreements, but these are more nonbinding 
than binding in character, since the decision to cooperate remains entirely at the discretion of 
domestic antitrust authorities.
183 Jenny, supra note 181, at 995. See also International Chamber of Commerce and Business 
and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the US 
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) 8 (5 June 2000), available at www.
biac.org/statements/comp/00- 06- ICC- BIAC_comments_on_ICPAC_report.pdf.
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the EU,184 leading to signifi cant convergence of their enforcement practices.185 And 
while frequent cooperation does not eliminate the risk of confl icting decisions, as the 
controversial GE/Honeywell merger demonstrated,186 enforcement confl icts between 
the United States and the EU are rare in practice.187 Indeed, the GE/Honeywell deci-
sion remains the only merger case in which the US and EU authorities have reached a 
confl icting decision. In contrast, developed countries have rarely sought cooperation 
agreements with developing countries.188 This might be because developed countries 
do not expect to gain much from such cooperation. Corporations based in developing 
countries are predominantly small and thus rarely able to acquire signifi cant market 
power in developed country markets. Developed countries’ domestic laws and superior 
enforcement resources also give them adequate power to regulate extra- territorially the 
conduct of developing country corporations, if necessary. Developed countries may also 
fear that they would be subject to frequent requests for enforcement assistance from 
developing countries, which do not have the resources to prosecute large corporations 
from  developed countries.
Multilateral institutions have complemented bilateral eff orts to foster nonbinding 
international antitrust cooperation. Both UNCTAD and the OECD have included 
antitrust matters on their agendas. UNCTAD has not played a major role in enhancing 
international antitrust convergence beyond its educational and capacity- building eff orts, 
and its role in international antitrust governance today is marginal.189 The OECD has 
184 See Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Commission of the 
European Communities regarding the Application of the Competition Law, US–EC, 23 September 
1991, US State Dep’t No. 91- 216, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1991 WL 495155; Agreement between the 
Government of the United States and the European Communities on the Application of Positive 
Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, art. III, US–EC, 4 June 1998, 
US State Dept. No. 98- 106, 1998 WL 428268. See also Press Release, US–EU Merger Working 
Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, 30 October 2002, available at www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/200405.pdf.
185 The eff ectiveness of transatlantic antitrust cooperation was also recognized by Robert 
Pitofsky, the former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, who noted in 2000 that ‘[t]here 
has been a remarkable convergence in substance between the EC and the U.S. in merger review in 
the last ten years . . . In my view, it is hard to imagine how day- to- day cooperation and coordina-
tion between enforcement offi  cials in Europe and the United States could be much improved’. See 
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, EU and US Approaches to International 
Mergers: Views from the US Federal Trade Commission, Address at the EC Merger Control 10th 
Anniversary Conference, 14–15 September 2000, available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ 
pitintermergers.shtm.
186 See supra note 60. 
187 For example, the EU prohibited a proposed merger between de Havilland and ATR, 
which was approved by the Canadian authorities. See Commission Decision of 2 October 1991, 
Aerospatiale- Alenia/de Havilland, Case No. Case No IV/M.053, [1991] O.J. L334/42 (12 May 
1991).
188 See Jenny, supra note 181, at 979, 993. 
189 See A. Douglas Melamed, Promoting Sound Antitrust Enforcement in the Global Economy, 
Address before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 19 October 2000, at § II–III, available at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/6785.htm (noting that UNCTAD has given technical assist-
ance, but noting that its mandate is not conducive to negotiating international convergence). In 
1980, the United Nation’s General Assembly adopted a nonbinding set of rules for the control of 
restrictive business practices (‘RBP Code’). See UNCTAD, A Set of Mutually Agreed Equitable 
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been more infl uential. I ts Governing Council and the Competition Committee have 
issued a series of nonbinding recommendations and best practice guidelines to facilitate 
cooperation and convergence among national antitrust regulators and their respective 
antitrust policies.190 The OECD has not sought to harmonize national antitrust laws or 
create uniform enforcement institutions. Instead, it has emphasized the need to enhance 
voluntary convergence in principles underlying antitrust policy, domestic policy objec-
tives, and enforcement practices.191 The most active forum for nonbinding multilateral 
antitrust cooperation since 2001 has been the International Competition Network (ICN). 
As an informal network of antitrust agencies, the ICN seeks to enhance policy conver-
gence, reduce transaction costs, and catalyse domestic reforms on a voluntary basis.192 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, TD/RBP/CONF/10/REV.1 
(1980). The RBP Code recommends member states to eliminate restrictive business practices 
by encouraging them to establish domestic antitrust regimes. In addition, the RBP Code urges 
businesses to refrain from engaging in anticompetitive practices. The RBP Code also established 
an Intergovernmental Group of Experts. The Group of Experts and the UNCTAD Secretariat 
have provided education and technical assistance to facilitate the adoption of antitrust laws in 
 developing countries. See Lianos, supra note 170, at 427. 
190 While the OECD also has the capacity to issue binding international norms, see, e.g., 1997 
International Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi  cials in International 
Business Transactions (‘Anti- Bribery Convention’), 8 April 1998, OECD Doc. Daff e/IME/BR 
(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1, cooperation within the antitrust domain has thus far been voluntary. Earlier 
OECD recommendations on antitrust cooperation focused on international consultation, notifi ca-
tion, investigative assistance, and information exchange among agencies. The Recommendation 
Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Anti- Competitive Practices Aff ecting 
International Trade was adopted in 1967 and amended in 1973, 1979, 1986, and 1995 (‘OECD 
Recommendation’). See Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning Co- operation 
Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Aff ecting International Trade, 28 July 
1995, OECD Doc. C(95)130/Final; OECD Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning 
Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Aff ecting International 
Trade, 21 May 1986, OECD Doc. C(86)44/Final; Recommendations of the Council of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development concerning Co-operation between 
Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Aff ecting International Trade, 25 September 
1979, OECD Doc. C(79)154/Final; Recommendation concerning a Consultation and Conciliation 
Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices Aff ecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(73)99/
Final (3 July 1973); Recommendation of the Council concerning Co- operation between Member 
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Aff ecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(67)54/
Final (5 October 1967). More recent recommendations have dealt with, for instance, merger 
review and action against hard- core cartels. See 2005 Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of 
Information between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/35590548.pdf; 1998 Recommendation of the Council concerning 
Eff ective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 25 March 1998, OECD Doc. C(98) 35/Final, available 
at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf.
191 Jenny, supra note 181, at 987; Tarullo, supra note 80, at 494–6.
192 For example, the ICN identifi es, develops, and publishes policy recommendations and best 
practices. ICN Report, supra note 82, at 18–23. See Budzinski, supra note 165, at 228 (describ-
ing the ICN’s functions and proposing to develop the ICN further to create an International 
Competition Panel that can exercise lead jurisdiction). The ICN, together with other international 
institutions, also off ers technical assistance to developing countries with the view of strengthen-
ing antitrust advocacy, building institutional capacity, and supporting market reforms in those 
countries. For more information on the purpose and the functioning of the ICN, see www.inter-
nationalcompetitionnetwork.org. See also Jenny, supra note 181, at 976–7 (discussing in more 
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Following the collapse of the WTO antitrust negotiations in 2003, the ICN has become 
the most infl uential international regime facilitating multilateral antitrust  cooperation 
today.
B Why Attempts to Negotiate International Antitrust Rules Have Failed
1 Disagreement on optimal rules
Section IIB explored the possibility that the risk of defection inherent in the prisoner’s 
dilemma would impede states from pursuing international antitrust cooperation. 
However, some scholars have questioned this premise. They argue that the greatest 
impediment for international cooperation does not stem from the possibility of defec-
tion but from the diffi  culty of reaching the right set of rules in the fi rst place. States 
prefer convergence to nonconvergence; they just cannot agree on optimal rules to 
converge on. Bradford, for instance, has argued against the widespread existence of 
PD- incentives,193 asserting instead that the collective action problem underlying inter-
national antitrust cooperation resembles a ‘coordination game’ where the distribu-
tional consequences of various forms of coordination impede states’ ability to settle on 
any given set of international rules.194 This theory assumes that diff erent antitrust rules 
are optimal for diff erent states. The costs and the benefi ts of a harmonized antitrust 
regime would therefore be unevenly distributed among states, creating a distributional 
confl ict. This distributional confl ict impedes states’ ability to agree on the focal point 
of coordination.195
The most prominent distributional confl ict ex ists between the United States and the 
EU. Despite the increasing alignment of the US and EU antitrust laws over the last 
decade, some key diff erences persist, as discussed above in section IC.196 These enduring 
diff erences explain why the United States and the EU have competed against each other 
to direct international convergence towards their respective antitrust laws.197 Even if 
both entities recognize that increased international coordination would lead to greater 
general terms the eff orts between national competition authorities to enhance cooperation and 
advocate policy).
193 Bradford, supra note 47, at 389–97.
194 Id. at 397–400.
195 See id. at 413–15; Wood, supra note 43, at 184 (concluding based on her government service 
that the diff erences between governments are too great at present to form a meaningful agree-
ment); Guzman, supra note 125, at 1155 (noting that the interests of exporters in supporting weak 
antitrust laws would confl ict directly with the interests of net-importers who would want strict 
antitrust laws); Stephan, supra note 122, at 74; Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 169 
(suggesting that, although countries may occasionally act opportunistically, most confl icts prob-
ably arise from good- faith diff erences of opinion). See also World Trade Organization, Report of 
the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, 
WT/WGTCP/6 (9 December 2002) (revealing a great diversity of viewpoints, even for smaller 
agenda items).
196 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 49.
197 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 7, at 1799 (explaining how the United States and the EU have 
actively exported their own antitrust laws to other countries in the recent decade in order to expand 
their regimes’ infl uence). 
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effi  ciency, each would prefer to internationalize their respective domestic antitrust 
regimes.198
This type of strategic situation is known as a coordination game with distributional 
consequences (CGDC) or a ‘battle of the sexes’.199 In a CGDC, both states prefer a coor-
dinated outcome to a noncoordinated outcome, even though both also favor coordinat-
ing at their respective preferred equilibrium. For instance, the United States and the EU 
might both prefer coordination to noncoordination given that their antitrust laws today 
are increasingly similar; neither the United States nor the EU would incur signifi cant 
adjustment costs if they were to coordinate to each other’s preferred equilibrium. Still, 
it is reasonable to assume that, given the choice, both players would favor their own 
respective regimes as the focal point of convergence. The challenge is to choose between 
the focal point the United States prefers (US antitrust law) and the focal point the EU 
prefers (EU antitrust law).
Similar distributional confl ict exists between developed countries and developing 
countries.200 Developed countries want any international antitrust regime to reduce 
multinational corporations’ (MNCs’) transaction costs of operating on global markets. 
They also seek to ‘level the playing fi eld’ by enhancing MNCs’ access to the developing- 
country markets.201 In contrast, developing countries resist the idea of a level playing 
fi eld, asserting that their small domestic corporations require protection to be able to 
compete against MNCs.202 Developing countries struggling with capacity constraints 
also fear that an international antitrust agreement would impose unduly burdensome 
obligations on them. Both developed countries and developing countries would benefi t 
from coordination, but they disagree on whether to coordinate around the focal point 
preferred by the former or the latter.
Even the proponents of an international antitrust agreement concede that the 
198 This assumption rests on the presumption that the status quo of the domestic antitrust 
regime represents the domestic political equilibrium on this particular issue. 
199 Simple coordination games that present no distributional consequences are relatively easy 
to solve as long as the parties can communicate. Neither player has a dominant strategy: there exist 
two Pareto- effi  cient outcomes that both players value equally and two Pareto- defi cient outcomes 
that both players want to avoid. Since both parties are indiff erent as to the choice between the two 
possible equilibria, the coordination is expected to be relatively smooth. In CGDC games, on the 
other hand, players hold diff erent preferences as to the actual point of coordination. Players agree 
on mutually undesirable outcomes (noncoordination) but disagree as to which of the two Pareto- 
effi  cient equilibria to coordinate on (focal point of coordination). This makes coordination in a 
CGDC situation diffi  cult.
200 Bradford, supra note 47, at 418–22.
201 Cf. Bernard M. Hoekman and Kamal Saggi, International Cooperation on Domestic 
Policies: Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate, in Economic Development and 
Multilateral Trade Cooperation 439, 446 (Simon J. Evenett and Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 
World Bank, 2006) (reporting that the European Union, the United States, and other OECD 
members wanted the WTO to address antitrust because they did not want national idiosyncrasies 
to impede market access).
202 Singh and Dhumale, supra note 69, at 127. Developing countries are also concerned with 
their inability to prosecute international cartels. See Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, 
Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Eff ects and Implications 
for Competition Policy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 801, 801–3 (2004).
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unequal distributional consequences of any international agreement would present a 
challenge for cooperation.203 This has led them to propose ways to overcome the dis-
tributional confl ict. Eleanor Fox, for instance, invokes the spirit of cosmopolitanism 
as a solution to the existing disagreements among antitrust jurisdictions on optimal 
law and policy.204 Fox calls on countries to bar government actions ‘where the harm 
[the action] causes to world welfare perceptibly outweighs the benefi t to the nation’s 
citizens’.205 However, critics have pointed out that this approach raises practical and 
moral concerns. On the practical level, data measuring ‘world’ and ‘domestic’ welfare 
would be hard to obtain and, once obtained, would remain controversial; it would also 
be diffi  cult for countries in the WTO to agree when ‘perceptible’ net losses to world 
welfare have occurred. On an even more fundamental level, Fox’s approach raises 
concern on whether ‘world welfare’ is the appropriate standard to use in the fi rst place. 
As Marsden argues, the national government’s obligations should lie with its national 
constituency.206
Andrew Guzman similarly recognizes that net- exporters and net- importers disagree 
on the optimal content of an international antitrust regime, the former seeking lax 
rules and the latter strict rules.207 To overcome the distributional confl ict between net- 
importers and net- exporters, Guzman proposes that states resort to transfer payments 
via the WTO.208 This way, winners can compensate losers and thereby overcome their 
resistance to the agreement. Others have questioned the feasibility of transfer pay-
ments in the case of WTO antitrust negotiations. Bradford, for instance, argues that 
the costs and the benefi ts arising from an international antitrust agreement are likely 
to be diff use, case- specifi c, and diffi  cult to forecast. As long as states remain unable 
ex ante to identify the winners and losers under an agreement, they do not know who 
should compensate whom and by how much. As a result, transfer payments would be 
diffi  cult to negotiate.209 Moreover, Trebilcock and Iacobucci have noted that, even if 
such transfer payments were feasible, they might be normatively objectionable because 
some countries would have to adopt antitrust laws that would decrease their domestic 
welfare.210
Absent linkages, states are likely to be forced to negotiate compromises that lead to 
203 See Guzman, supra note 125, at 1155–6 (noting that net- exporters and net- importers will 
have diff erent objectives); Fox, supra note 42, at 12 (observing that many countries with more 
statist traditions may be concerned about diff erent goals than the United States or the EU such as 
the distribution of wealth or tight control over the potential abuses of multinational corporations).
204 The cosmopolitan view, as Fox characterizes it, means taking ‘concern for the interests 
of the entire community without regard to nationality, while recognizing the legitimate role for 
national and provincial governments to act in the interest of their citizens’. Fox, supra note 42, at 
3 n.4.
205 Id. The WTO Secretariat has expressed similar sentiments, suggesting that ‘the negative 
consequences for foreign interests must exceed the benefi ts to domestic agents’ in order for the 
national competition policy to be deemed an ineffi  cient allocation of resources from a global point 
of view. Marsden, supra note 7, at 197.
206 Id. at 251.
207 Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, supra note 125, at 1155.
208 Id. at 1155–8.
209 Bradford, supra note 47, at 422–32.
210 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, supra note 42, at 171.
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shallow international obligations.211 The United States has resisted the WTO antitrust 
agreement precisely because of the fear that a binding international agreement would 
weaken antitrust laws throughout the world. Confl icting regulatory priorities would 
inevitably lead to a watered- down compromise, weakening antitrust laws worldwide.212 
At worst, the WTO antitrust agreement would m erely codify the lowest common denomi-
nator among its broad and diverse membership.213 Diane Wood similarly predicts that 
eff orts to reach a compromise in the midst of vast disagreement would merely lead to 
international rules riddled with exceptions.214 Proponents of the WTO antitrust agree-
ment may respond that initially weak antitrust commitments could deepen with time as a 
result of voluntary convergence and gradual alignment of states’ preferences.215 However, 
the WTO does not generally lend itse lf well to the idea of ‘gradualism’. Frequent revision 
of WTO obligations would call for new negotiations among over 150 states. These nego-
tiations would inevitably be slow and costly, producing, at best, an uncertain outcome.216
2 Costs of international convergence
Limited net benefi ts stemming from the agreement Another impediment for an interna-
tional antitrust agreement is the perception that the net benefi ts of such an agreement 
would be limited. Several scholars have argued that the costs of a binding international 
211 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 173, at 7–9; Wood, supra note 43, at 186 (arguing that any 
consensus could only be achieved after diluting the law to the point that it lacks any real guiding 
content).
212 See Wood, supra note 43, at 186; Roscoe B. Starek, III, Commissioner, Federal Trade 
Commission, International Aspects of Antitrust Enforcement, Address at the Antitrust 1996 
Conference, 29 September 1995, available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/starekda.htm (‘The 
sticking point is whether agreement can be reached on a suffi  ciently stringent set of antitrust poli-
cies. It is the fear of a “lowest- common- denominator” antitrust code that has made many American 
policymakers skeptical about pursuing a world code’); see also A. Douglas Melamed, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement in the Global Economy, 
Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 25th Annual Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy, 22 October 1998, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2043.
htm (‘any WTO rules would be lowest- common- denominator rules that would merely serve to 
justify weak national antitrust enforcement. Third, such lowest- common- denominator rules would 
serve little purpose’). Every new attempt to accommodate divergent preferences stripped the anti-
trust agreement of more meaningful content. The most recent proposal for a WTO antitrust agree-
ment is the most unambitious yet: rather than proposing any substantive rules, it merely extends 
the fundamental yet vague WTO principles of ‘transparency’ or ‘national treatment’ to antitrust 
matters. See Bradford, supra note 173, at 8.
213 See Starek, supra note 212; Melamed, supra note 212.
214 Wood, supra note 43, at 185–6.
215 See, e.g., Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at 926–32 (explaining that the world is not yet 
ready for a global consensus on principles and suggesting horizontal cooperation in the meantime); 
Guzman, supra note 30, at 437–40 (proposing several possibilities for small- scale cooperation). 
In general, this approach is advanced by the ‘transformational approach’. Transformationalists 
endorse shallow framework agreements with broadest possible participation and claim that com-
mitments that are initially shallow deepen with time. For a discussion and critique of transfor-
mationalism, see George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of International Regime 
Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 465 (2000). 
216 See Bradford, supra note 173, at 9; Stephan, supra note 122, at 80.
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antitrust agreement may exceed its benefi ts.217 There are three principal reasons for this. 
First, the benefi ts from such an agreement are hard to predict and possibly not as great 
as generally presumed. Second, the opportunity costs of forgoing the agreement are 
relatively low. Third, negotiating a binding international agreement would be costly, par-
ticularly when compared to the uncertain benefi ts stemming from coordination and the 
lack of high opportunity costs under the status quo.218 These reasons are discussed below.
An international antitrust agreement may yield disappointing returns for several reasons. 
If the parties to the agreement dilute its substance to accommodate distributional tensions, 
the agreement will no longer generate any net benefi ts to off set the costs of negotiating the 
agreement.219 Also, the externalities from multijurisdictional antitrust enforcement may 
not be as great as commonly presumed, making reform unnecessary. Scholars often point 
to multijurisdictional merger review as an example of an antitrust action that involves high 
transaction costs. However, as discussed above, these ‘high’ transaction costs seem rela-
tively small when compared to the total costs of the deal.220 Another example comes from 
a recent US International Trade Commission survey, which challenges the presumption 
that anticompetitive practices would constitute signifi cant nontariff  barriers that compro-
mise the gains of trade liberalization.221 Third, unlike in other areas involving regulatory 
competition, antitrust law does not carry the risk of a detrimental race to the bottom, as 
discussed above; this reduces the need to pursue international rules.222
Also the opportunity costs of forgoing global antitrust rules are relatively low.223 
Most states – the strong antitrust jurisdictions in particular – can apply their domestic 
antitrust laws extra- territorially as long as their respective domestic markets are aff ected 
by the alleged anticompetitive conduct. Extra- territorial enforcement by the importing 
jurisdiction limits externalities stemming from any underenforcement of antitrust laws 
by the exporting jurisdiction.224 Further, the existing bilateral agreements and voluntary 
217 Bradford, supra note 47, at 410–13.
218 McGinnis, supra note 140, at 126. McGinnis maintains that harmonization would be costly 
and likely to retard rather than advance the goals of antitrust enforcement. Id. at 129.
219 Bradford, supra note 173, at 9–11.
220 See discussion supra.
221 The USITC statistics analyse data collected by the USTR, the EU, and the WTO to evaluate 
the relative harmfulness of various nontariff  barriers (NTBs) that may impede the free fl ow of goods 
and services. The study compiles data from 53 economies, dividing the information into 15 cat-
egories of NTBs, ‘anticompetitive practices/competition policy’ being one of them. As a category, 
‘anticompetitive practices/competition policy’ was second to last in frequency among the NTBs. 
‘Anticompetitive practices/competition policy’ was also second to last in terms of the number of 
economies in which the measure was reported. See Diane Manifold and William Donnelly, A 
Compilation from Multiple Sources of Reported Measures which May Aff ect Trade, in Quantitative 
Methods for Assessing the Effects of Non- Tariff Measures and Trade Facilitation 41–50 
(Philippa Dee and Michael Ferrantino eds, World Scientifi c, 2005).
222 See discussion supra (discussing the ‘strictest regime wins’ problem, in which the law of the 
strictest jurisdiction has the power to set the de facto world standard).
223 Bradford, supra note 47, at 433–5 (comparing the relatively low opportunity costs to forgo-
ing antitrust agreements to the relatively high opportunity costs of forgoing intellectual property 
agreements).
224 However, extra- territoriality does not solve the overenforcement problem raised by the 
‘strictest regime wins’ phenomenon.
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multilateral cooperation within the OECD and the ICN have enhanced convergence 
and reduced the frictions arising from decentralized enforcement. While voluntary 
guidelines and case- by- case cooperation may have their limits, they may lower the 
opportunity cost enough to make the expected benefi ts of a global antitrust regime no 
longer worthwhile.225 Paul Stephan also argues that international rules are unneces-
sary because there are suffi  cient market incentives for states to refrain from over- and 
underenforcement of their antitrust rules. For instance, a state that chooses to protect 
domestic producers against welfare- enhancing competition does so at the expense of 
future investment and innovation, the welfare of its consumers, and the competitiveness 
of its industries. 226
Finally, negotiating and implementing an international agreement would be costly. 
Contracting costs are particularly high in an institution like the WTO where numerous 
states with divergent preferences are seeking to agree on binding norms.227 The need to 
secure domestic ratifi cation of the agreement in (presumably) most WTO member states 
would add to the contracting costs. The negotiations would also be slow and cumber-
some: the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations required eight years to complete. The 
current Doha Round, launched in 2001, is still ongoing. Pursuing a WTO antitrust agree-
ment would hence almost inevitably be a slow and costly process. Implementing and 
enforcing international rules would also be costly, in particular for developing countries 
with limited institutional capacity, technical expertise, and fi nancial resources. The costs 
associated with international rules were a major reason why developing countries blocked 
the antitrust talks in the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun.228 Consequently, the 
prospect of international antitrust laws, while yielding certain undeniable effi  ciencies, 
may simply not have been a priority for states due to high costs, limited gains, and the 
absence of signifi cant opportunity costs.
Agency costs and institutional limitations The international antitrust regime could also 
entail higher agency costs, reducing the welfare eff ects of antitrust laws. Stephan has 
opposed delegating antitrust decision- making powers to the WTO precisely because 
of the prospect of higher agency costs.229 All agencies vested with discretion have the 
capacity to act arbitrarily. Often, states can mitigate these agency problems by curtailing 
agencies’ discretion (‘bonding’) ex ante and supervising their behavior (‘monitoring’) ex 
225 Bradford, supra note 47, Id. at 439; Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at 929–30.
226 Stephan, supra note 122, at 67.
227 States would negotiate each provision more cautiously when they know that they will be 
legally bound by the agreement. 
228 See Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure, Financial Times (London), 23 
September 2003, at 16 (‘It is absurd to push, as the EU has done, to impose rules in complex areas 
such as competition and investment on countries so poor that some cannot even aff ord WTO 
diplomatic representation’). See also Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: 
Politics or Substance?, 31 Legal Issues of Econ. Integration 7 (2004). The developing coun-
tries would also have to sustain higher political costs because their import- competing industries 
and former state- owned enterprises would resist any reforms that would remove the government 
protection they enjoy. See William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy 
Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 403, 404–5 (1997). 
229 Stephan, supra note 173, at 198–201; Stephan, supra note 122, at 77–9.
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post.230 Bonding and monitoring an international agent that administers and enforces an 
agreement of substantive antitrust policy would, however, be particularly challenging, 
for two reasons. First, the principals (the WTO member states) do not share an under-
standing on optimal antitrust rules, making bonding diffi  cult. This would leave an inter-
national agent with wide discretion. Second, monitoring the agent would be ineff ective 
because of the diffi  culty of reforming international regimes even if states were dissatisfi ed 
with the agent.231 Thus, according to Stephan, international antitrust agreement would 
entail a risk of replicating, if not magnifying, the government failures experienced at the 
domestic level.232
John McGinnis opposes international antitrust agreement on similar grounds. He 
argues that such an agreement would create higher agency costs, while depriving states of 
the distinct benefi ts that the decentralized enforcement regime provides.233 For example, 
there are fewer ways of holding an international antitrust regime democratically account-
able than there are for domestic agencies.234 Being more opaque than domestic adminis-
trative processes, the monitoring costs of an international agent would be higher.235 The 
dangers of agency capture would also be more severe: political rents available on a global 
scale are expected to be higher, inducing interest groups to expend more resources on 
costly lobbying.236 Whereas interest groups have to capture numerous agencies under the 
decentralized antitrust regime, interest groups under the unifi ed regime would only need 
to capture one agency to infl uence an outcome.237
Stephan also emphasizes the diffi  culties associated with creating institutions and 
reforming them. International institutions are infl exible in their decision- making and 
therefore often incapable of responding to changing circumstances. McGinnis agrees, 
emphasizing the high lock- in costs of international institutions in a rapidly changing 
world. These costs can deter benefi cial change.238 In contrast, decentralized antitrust 
enforcement creates opportunities for legal innovation, experiment, and mutual learn-
ing.239 Wolfgang Kerber and Oliver Budzinski take this view. They argue that states can 
use each other’s experiences to re- assess their own antitrust regimes, imitating success-
ful regimes and correcting their own errors as necessary.240 They maintain that no one 
country knows which rules are best ex ante, and see the freedom to experiment in multiple 
230 See generally Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) (proposing bonding 
and monitoring as an appropriate solution for agency problems).
231 See Stephan, supra note 122, at 66, 77–9.
232 See id.
233 McGinnis, supra note 140, at 129.
234 See id. at 126; Wood, supra note 43, at 185.
235 McGinnis, supra note 140, at 129.
236 Id.
237 But see Josef Drexl, Comments on Harry First: Decentralized Antitrust Enforcement and 
the Evolution of an International Common Law of Antitrust, in The Future of Transnational 
Antitrust: From Comparative to Common Competition Law 60 (Josef Drexl ed., Kluwer, 2003) 
(arguing that, in practice, the European Commission has been less subject to the political infl uence 
of private businesses than national governments).
238 McGinnis, supra note 140, at 126.
239 Id.
240 See Kerber and Budzinski, supra note 27, at 36–9 (describing the concept they call  ‘yardstick 
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jurisdictions as an opportunity to test competing theories. Indeed, several commentators 
have argued that the criticism directed at the EU in the aftermath of the GE/Honeywell 
decision prompted several changes in the European antitrust regime, shifting the EU’s 
enforcement closer to that of the United States.241
The WTO also has serious institutional limitations that impede its ability to eff ectively 
embrace new areas of regulation, including antitrust.242 Diane Wood, for instance, fears 
that incorporating antitrust within the WTO would lead to institutional and political 
overload of the organization.243 At worst, this could weaken the WTO’s ability to carry 
out its key mission: to liberalize world trade. Several commentators note that the WTO 
is predominantly a trade organization with limited expertise in antitrust.244 They fear that 
the WTO could confl ate antitrust issues with trade policy considerations in its decision- 
making.245 The United States in particular has opposed a WTO antitrust agreement on 
these grounds.246 It has repeatedly emphasized the need to avoid enmeshing antitrust with 
trade policy.247 This stands in stark contrast to the EU, which is comfortable in entangling 
trade and antitrust policies. After all, the EU’s antitrust laws were enacted predominantly 
to complement the goal of establishing a Common Market and ensuring that the eff orts 
to remove trade barriers would not be frustrated by private barriers to trade.248
Consequently, opposition to a global antitrust regime revolves around several related 
competition’, in which countries mutually learn from one another by observing one another’s 
 successes and failures).
241 See, e.g., Mario Monti, Commissioner for Competition Policy, Feedback to the Green 
Paper: An Overview, Remarks Before the Conference on Reform of European Merger Control (4 
June 2002), available at europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5SPEECH/02/252&fo
rmat5PDF&aged51&language5EN&guiLanguage5en; McGinnis, supra note 140, at 131; Fox, 
supra note 60, at 353–4, 358–9.
242 See Stephan, supra note 122, at 80–81.
243 Wood, supra note 43, at 185. Stephan agrees, asserting that extending the scope of the 
WTO to new areas, including antitrust, would be precarious. At worst, it would reduce the WTO’s 
capacity for eff ective intervention in traditional areas of trade liberalization. See Stephan, supra 
note 122, at 81. 
244 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of 
International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 37, 91–2 (2007). In response 
to the criticism that the WTO does not have suffi  cient expertise in antitrust, Guzman proposes 
changes in the organizational structure of the institution: the WTO could be divided into special-
ized departments, each vested with the responsibility and corresponding expertise in a particular 
substantive area. See Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 
303, 306, 310 (2004). Under this proposal, a WTO department could develop specialized knowledge 
particular to the WTO, much as antitrust divisions in national jurisdictions do now.
245 See Tarullo, supra note 80, at 493–4 (predicting that broadening the WTO’s agenda to 
include antitrust will strain its ability to address other trade- related parts of its mission). In con-
trast, scholars such as Fox are not worried about this potential confl ation, and even welcome exist-
ing trade concepts as a potential platform on which to build basic consensus and protocol rules. 
See Fox, Doha Dome, supra note 166, at 926, 929–30.
246 See Melamed, supra note 189, at § II.
247 See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 212, at § III. See also Spencer Weber Waller, The Decline of 
the Nation State and its Eff ect on Constitutional and International Economic Law: Contribution: 
National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of Cooperation and Enforcement of Competition 
Law, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1111, 1123 (1996). 
248 See Bradford, supra note 47, at 406–9; Bradford, supra note 173, at 6.
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perceptions: that divergences across states loom too great, that such a regime would rep-
resent the lowest common denominator, that the global regime would not entail suffi  cient 
net benefi ts to make it a priority, or that it would magnify agency problems or even subject 
antitrust rules to trade policy. These reasons, taken together, help us understand why 
eff orts to negotiate an international antitrust agreement have failed. Still, the idea of inter-
national antitrust governance continues to invite vibrant scholarly discussion. The last 
section of this chapter will sketch possible directions for that discussion going forward.
IV CONCLUSION
The above discussion has exposed the dual problem underlying international antitrust 
law. Section II discussed how decentralized antitrust enforcement can produce externali-
ties and reduce global welfare. Section III discussed how seeking increased convergence 
across jurisdictions may not be optimal either. This has led international antitrust schol-
ars to search for ways to reduce negative externalities embedded in the decentralized anti-
trust regime, while respecting each antitrust jurisdiction’s freedom to design its own laws.
Debate on the optimal balance between convergence and divergence continues. Two 
trends have emerged to shape the direction of this debate. First, those engaged in the dis-
cussion are beginning to appreciate that the world of antitrust extends beyond the United 
States and the European Union. Second, scholars are beginning to realize the paucity of 
empirical scholarship on international antitrust law.
The United States and the European Union remain the two most signifi cant antitrust 
jurisdictions in the world. Comparative inquiries into their antitrust laws and enforce-
ment practices continue to be fruitful. However, the center of gravity for international 
business activity is increasingly shifting to emerging markets. Goldman Sachs has pre-
dicted that by 2035, the GDP of the ‘BRIC’ countries (referring to Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) will exceed the GDP of the current G- 7 countries.249 The scholarship on 
international antitrust law should seek to anticipate the implications this development 
has for antitrust law. This also requires revisiting the distinction between developed coun-
tries and developing countries. Today, developing countries comprise a diverse group of 
states, with vastly diff erent domestic markets, levels of openness, political economies, and 
institutional capacities. China and Kenya cannot be expected to balance similar concerns 
when designing their domestic antitrust regimes. The increasing heterogeneity among 
developing countries has given new impetus for the debate on how diff erent market con-
ditions and political economies shape antitrust laws, how universal the economic theories 
underlying antitrust enforcement are, and how adaptable these theories are for guiding 
countries that do not share the same economic or political history and that face diff erent 
opportunities and challenges.
On the methodological side, while domestic antitrust law has for a long time benefi ted 
from sophisticated analytical tools, scholarship on international antitrust law has not 
249 Goldman Sachs, BRICS and Beyond 5 (November 2007), available at www2.goldmansachs.
com/ideas/brics/BRICs- and- Beyond.html. The G- 7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
M2832 - ELHAUGE TEXT.indd   325 26/01/2012   16:25
Einer R. Elhauge - 9781848440807
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/09/2016 02:56:26PM
via NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SHARING or POSTING
326  Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law
taken full advantage of insights from economics or other disciplines. More recently, 
scholars have employed new tools, including game theory and empirical methods, to 
bring more analytical coherence into the fi eld.250 The ICN study measuring the costs of 
multijurisdictional merger enforcement was a welcome early step in the right direction.251 
Some areas of international antitrust law have already received more attention by empiri-
cists. Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow have studied the eff ect of international 
cartels on developing countries.252 They have also made a signifi cant contribution to our 
understanding of the prevalence and harmfulness of export cartels.253 Building on work 
done by Nicholson,254 Keith Hylton and Fei Deng have undertaken an ambitious project 
seeking to quantify antitrust laws around the world. Studying variations across antitrust 
jurisdictions, they developed a ‘scope index’ to measure the extent to which antitrust 
laws of a given country are likely to catch anticompetitive conduct.255 Their fi ndings are 
less credible because of their exclusive focus on antitrust laws in books – they do not 
incorporate actual enforcement realities when constructing the scope index. Still, they 
have contributed a founding work to empirical international antitrust law scholarship 
on which other scholars in the future are likely to build. Such future work will help us 
verify the importance of the problems underlying international antitrust law that are 
often assumed rather than empirically validated.
250 For a game theory- based analysis of antitrust cooperation strategies, see generally Bradford, 
supra note 47. In addition to empirical work mentioned in this section, see generally Daniel Sokol 
and Kyle Steigert, An Empirical Evaluation of Long Term Advisors and Short Term Interventions in 
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2008- 03, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id51095884; Çaglar Özden, International Dimensions of Competition Policies: European Responses 
to American Mergers, 56 Revenue Economique 1413 (2005); Simon Evenett and Alexander Hijzen, 
Conformity with International Recommendations on Merger Reviews: An Economic Perspective 
on ‘Soft Law’ (University of Nottingham Research Paper No. 2006/04, 2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id5893034.
251 ICN Report, supra note 82.
252 Levenstein and Suslow, supra note 202, at 800–806.
253 Levenstein and Suslow, supra note 145, at 792–3.
254 See generally Michael W. Nicholson, Quantifying Antitrust Regimes, 3 Erasmus L. and 
Econ. Rev. 41 (2007). For a more recent follow- up to the original study, see generally Nicholson, 
supra note 75.
255 See generally Hylton and Deng, supra note 9. 
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